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Figure 1: Phase model of Syria travellers and returnees, p. 13 






Since the end of 2012, the phenomenon of persons travelling to and return-
ing from Syria and Iraq has featured prominently on the agenda of many 
Western countries, with measures being taken in an attempt to control the 
problem. This report makes use of publicly available information to look at a 
variety of measures, including criminal prosecution, restrictions such as the 
seizure of travel documents, and social interventions. These measures are 
here referred to as person-specific measures. They differ from measures with 
a different scope that, for instance, seek to foster social resilience or ban 
organisations; these measures fall outside the bound of this report.  
The measures are enacted in different phases: 
Persons who are still in their country of residence: criminal law statutes that 
penalise making preparations to commit terrorist offences are used to 
prevent people travelling out (the Netherlands, Belgium, France and the US). 
At this stage it is not always easy to gather the required evidence. Voiding 
passports and identity documents is a frequently-used measure to prevent 
people travelling out. In spite of its application, there are known cases in 
which people have still managed to travel out. The US forms an exception to 
the passport rule, seeking instead to obtain the same effect by placing 
persons on a no-fly list. In countries including Belgium, Germany, France 
and the US, the police or other security services approach potential travellers 
to get them to change their minds. 
Persons travelling to Syria/Iraq with the possible intention of participating 
in the armed jihadist struggle: information about the person’s exit journey is 
shared bilaterally with, for example, Turkey or through international 
channels (Europol, Interpol, CTG) in order to monitor the traveller. People 
known to have travelled out are removed from the municipal personal 
records database in countries such as the Netherlands and Belgium. Addi-
tionally, they are excluded from social services and their financial assets are 
frozen. These measures are also taken against persons travelling out of Den-
mark, France, the UK and other countries. 
Persons residing in areas of conflict in Syria/Iraq: all reviewed countries are 




many), deploying special forces (Denmark, France, the UK and the US) or 
carrying out air strikes (the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, France, the UK 
and the US). Only the UK and the US have carried out targeted killings of 
their own nationals in areas of conflict. There have also been criminal con-
victions in absentia (the Netherlands and Belgium). 
Persons leaving areas of conflict and travelling back to their country of 
residence: a number of countries provide consular assistance (the Nether-
lands and France). In one case, Belgium refused to repatriate a Belgian na-
tional. Generally speaking, there is little publicly available information with 
which to gain a sound overview of the subject. 
Persons who have returned to their country of residence: in all countries 
under review, returnees have been convicted for membership in a terrorist 
organisation or for criminal acts committed in Syria/Iraq. In addition, restric-
tive measures are in place, including the seizure of passports or monitoring 
persons with the use of electronic tags. All reviewed countries have social 
reintegration trajectories, although these are more developed in some coun-
tries than in others. 
In general it can be said that the reviewed countries all have similar appro-
aches while also having smaller individual differences. The report gives rise 
to three questions: 
● What is the added value of new counter-terrorism legislation? 
● Can restrictive measures such as imposing electronic tags and moni-
toring schemes actually reduce the risk of attacks? 
● Is there a taboo on person-specific measures such as consular assis-
tance at the stage where travellers are in Syria/Iraq and want to leave 






1  Introduction 
From the time when the problem of people travelling to areas of conflict in 
Syria and Iraq became a topical issue at the end of 2012, many European 
countries as well as the United States (US) have taken measures to prevent 
actual or would-be travellers and to prosecute and/or monitor returnees. 
These include existing, reinforced as well as newly introduced measures. 
Initially, the focus was on ways of preventing people travelling out. This 
emphasis is shifting, with increasing concerns about returnees and their 
children.
1
 This report provides an overview of measures taken, and the 
instances in which they are being taken, by the Netherlands, Belgium, Den-
mark, Germany, France, the United Kingdom (UK) and the US in the period 
from 2010 to the end of 2016. 
A range of different measures, varying in nature and in scope, are taken with 
regard to travellers and returnees. This report focuses on what are here called 
person-specific measures, while initiatives aimed at strengthening social 
cohesion or banning organisations do not fall within its scope. Person-speci-
fic measures include legislation regarding terrorist offences and reintergrat-
ion programmes. Measures in the ambit of immigration law and administra-
tive moves to seize travel documents are also part of the spectrum of measur-
es taken. 
The report shows that the reviewed countries generally take similar initia-
tives. Nonetheless, there are significant differences between these countries 
in terms of political organisation, powers and legal culture. The response to 
the phenomenon of travellers and returnees can be also seen as a search for 
ways to limit their freedom of movement. In a broader sense, this report 
attempts to shed light on the changing toolbox states have at their disposal as 
they try to face up to potentially violent, internationally operating non-state 
actors. 
The report is structured as follows. A discussion in chapter two of the study 
design and methods is followed by six thematic chapters providing an inven-
tory of policy per country. Chapter three deals with criminal law. Chapter 
                                                                
1 See for instance: Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid 2017; Nationaal 




four looks at the seizure of travel documents, the imposition of other travel 
restrictions and the revocation of nationality. Chapter five discusses other 
restrictive measures. Chapter six deals with ‘social’ interventions, both by 
security services and by social workers, aimed at reintegration. Chapter 
seven looks at the national collection and international exchange of intelli-
gence, investigative options and detection. Chapter eight looks at military 
engagement. The conclusion discusses similarities and differences between 
the examined countries. It identifies some dilemmas around measures taken 





2  Study design and methods 
A number of decisions were made with regard to the structure of this series 
of reports, as detailed below. 
2.1  Background to this series 
This study was made possible in part by financial support from the National 
Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV). There have been 
many developments in the field of tackling jihadism since 2012. The goal of 
this report is to contribute to a better insight into Dutch policy as well as that 
of Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, the UK and the US through a 
comparison of national policies. This report is the second in a series, the first 
report outlining counter-terrorism policy and the prevention of radicalisation 
in these countries.
2
 The reports contribute to increased knowledge around 
tackling jihadism by examining the approach of six other Western countries 
and comparing these approaches to the Dutch approach. 
2.2  The phase model 
Various stages of travelling out and returning have been distinguished in 
order to classify measures taken against travellers or returnees. For a graphic 
representation of these stages, see figure 1 on page 13. Phase one is when 
the person is still in his or her country of residence while there is a suspected 
intention of travelling out. Phase two starts when the person is on the way to 
a foreign destination, possibly with a view to participating in jihad. Phase 
three spans the person’s presence in a foreign area of conflict in the context 
of the jihadist struggle. Phase four starts when the person abandons the 
jihadist struggle and travels back to the US or the Schengen Area. Phase five 
covers the person’s actual presence back in the Schengen Area or the US. 
The phase model is an analytical concept that helps to interpret the moment 
measures are applied. 
However, there are some limitations to this model and its application. For 
example, it presupposes a circular movement of travel out of and return to 
                                                                




the home country or the country of residence, whereas not all travellers 
necessarily follow this cycle. Several pathways are possible, including per-
manent residence in the present or former area of conflict, or onward travel 
to other countries.
3
 As far as applying the model, it is not always equally 
clear in which phase a specific measure is being taken. The voiding of travel 
documents is an example of this. This limitation mainly followed from the 
public sources that were consulted and that do not always provide sufficient 
information. Additionally, some measures can be applied across all of the 
phases. Our response to this limitation has been not to structure the report in 
accordance with the phases, but rather according to types of measures. This 
structure was arrived at inductively following an inventory of measures. The 
phase in which a given measure is implemented is noted in the left margin. 
























                                                                
3 See for further elaboration Reed, De Roy van Zuijdewijn and Bakker 2015.  
I: (still) in the country 
The person is (still) in the EU or the US, 
but travelling out to Syria is suspected 
II: Travel 
The person is en route to a foreign 
destination, possibly to join violent jihadist 
groups 
III: Stay in the conflict zone abroad 
The person resides abroad 
IV: Travel  
The person leaves the conflict zone 
V: Return to the EU or the US 





2.3  Terminology 
We will here go into a number of core concepts. Firstly, there is the term 
jihadism, which in the Dutch discourse has evolved into the most common 
term for referring to what the National Counterterrorism Strategy 2016-2020 
calls the ‘main threat (...) to our national security’.
4
 The concept of jihadism 
has gained widespread currency in Dutch policy documents from 2004 on, 
replacing terms such as ‘Islamist terrorism’ and ‘radical Islamic groups’, the 
latter term having been used up to 2001.
5
 The NCTV defines jihadism as ‘an 
extreme political ideology that attempts to comply with the obligation, 
experienced as a divine one, to spread Islam around the world. This is to be 
achieved by waging a “holy war” against all unbelievers: everything that 
deviates from the “pure doctrine” as understood by jihadists must, they 
believe, be opposed violently’.
6
 This holy war is also referred to as the 
‘lesser jihad’, the armed struggle in defence of Islam. In this report, the term 
jihadism does not refer to its primary meaning in the Quran – the greater 
jihad – which refers to the inner effort of believers to live as good Muslims.
7
  
There have also been alternatives to the concepts of ‘uitreiziger’ (person 
travelling out) and ‘terugkeerder’ (returnee). These alternatives are some-
times still used and include the terms ‘jihadgangers’ (persons travelling out 
to perform jihad), ‘jihadstrijders’ (jihadist fighters), ‘Syriëgangers’ (Syria 
travellers) and ‘buitenlandse strijders’ (foreign fighters).
8
 This search for the 
most appropriate terminology reflects the attempt to define the problem. 
Governments as well as media use a range of different terms, as can be seen 
in table one below. For the sake of readability, this report uses the concepts 
‘traveller’ or ‘Syria traveller’ in reference to a person travelling out and 
‘returnee’ in reference to a person returning. 
 
 
                                                                
4 Rijksoverheid 2016, p. 6. 
5 Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst 2005; Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst 2002.  
6 Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid 2016. 
7 Berger 2006, p. 203. 




Table 1: Recent terminology for Syria travellers in the examined countries 
(2014-2017) 
Country Name 








Germany ‘Ausgereisten’, ‘Rückkehrer’, ‘islamistische Kämpfer’
11
 
France ‘[L]es filières syro-irakiennes’, ‘djihadistes’
12
 
United Kingdom ‘Foreign fighters’, ‘Isis fighters’
13
 




Lastly, the term restrictive measure requires an explanation. For the pur-
poses of this report, the distinctive element of a restrictive measure is its 
punitive effect, without necessarily implying the use of criminal law.
15
 A 
restrictive measure can be imposed in the course of a trial, but it can also be 
imposed by an administrative authority. ‘Restrictive measure’ is an umbrella 
term and refers to the possibly better known but narrower category of 
administrative measures which governments may apply as an alternative to 
legal sanctions. Administrative measures are generally applied by the gov-
ernment, whereas restrictive measures may also be imposed by a court. We 
return to this matter in chapter five on Other restrictive measures. Different 
legal traditions in each country also lead to differences in the competence of 
governments or courts to impose restrictive measures and in the circum-
stances in which these measures can be imposed. In view of these differen-
ces and for the sake of readability, this report uses the term restrictive (rather 
than administrative) measures, unless otherwise indicated. 
                                                                
9 Foreign Terrorist Fighters and ‘Syriëstrijders’: FOD Binnenlandse Zaken 2016; Minister van 
Binnenlandse Zaken and minister van Justitie 2015; Vlaamse regering 2015; ‘Syriëstrijders’: De 
Standaard 2017. 
10 ‘Personer’ and ‘udrejsende’: Politiets Efterretningstjeneste 2014; ‘syrienkriger’ and ‘fremmedkriger’: 
Hornstrup Yde 2016. 
11 ‘Ausgereisten’ and ‘Rückkehrer’: Bundesministerium des Innern 2016a; ‘Islamistische Kämpfer’: 
Frankfurter Allgemeine 2017. 
12 ‘Filières’: Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 2015; Premier Ministre 2016; ‘Djihadistes’: Cornevin 2017. 
13 Foreign fighters: HM Government 2016; Isis fighters: Gayle 2017. 
14 Foreign terrorist fighters: U.S. Department of State 2017; ISIS Fighters: Schmitt 2017. 




2.4  The national context 
Jihadism is an international phenomenon. It is being tackled through cooper-
ation in a number of international forums and regular consultations. These 
forums include the United Nations (UN), the Council of Europe, the Europe-
an Union (EU), the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF; an internation-
al meeting of experts and policymakers aimed at improving the response to 
terrorism and the prevention of radicalisation), and the Counter Terrorism 
Group (CTG; part of the so-called Club de Berne, an informal, six-monthly 
meeting of mainly European security services). The implementation of pol-
icy, however, takes place in the national context.  
This report will focus on policy and legislation drafted or used to tackle 
jihadism, and will therefore look mainly at the national context. Activities in 
connection with international partnerships largely fall outside of the scope of 
this study; chapter seven will look at these international forums. Within the 
national delimitations, the study also looks at regional or local initiatives, 
even though the focus is on policy at the national level.  
2.5  Selection of countries 
This study looks at seven countries: the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, France the UK and the US. These countries were selected on the 
basis of the following considerations: they are countries neighbouring the 
Netherlands (Belgium and Germany), the country plays a leading role in 
tackling jihadism (UK), the approach is different (Denmark and France) or 
little is known about the approach (US). 
2.6  Time period 
The report looks at laws, policy and policy initiatives in the period 2010 to 
the end of 2016. 
2.7  Sources, limitations and methods 
This report looks at policy that has a bearing on dealing with actual and 
would-be Syria travellers and returnees. It has been attempted to approach 




the introduction, there are limits to this approach due to differences in 
political organisation, competences and legal cultures. The study is based on 
publicly available information such as government documents, parliament-
tary questions and studies, court cases or press reports about them, media 
reports in general, and academic and other studies. Unfortunately, it is not 
always possible to determine on the basis of these sources whether – and if 
so, when and how often – specific measures were applied. It must also be 
noted that limited public information is available for the chapters Intelli-
gence, investigation and detection and Military engagement and repatriation.  
When examining the sources, we first looked whether the policy is declara-
tory – formally having an instrument at one’s disposal or having the inten-
tion to use an instrument – and then looked whether, when and how often the 
instruments were used. Where possible, we give examples of the application 
of particular policies. Relevant academic literature has been used to interpret 
developments and a number of academic experts have been consulted to 





3  Criminal law 
3.1  Introduction 
Many Western European countries have introduced new criminal legislation 
with which to prosecute actual and would-be Syria travellers and returnees. 
An important impetus for this was UN resolution 2178 from 2014, which 
called for activities related to travelling out of a country for terrorist pur-
poses to be made a criminal offence.
1
 A number of countries already had 
relevant legislation in place. Changes to criminal law areas dealing with 
terrorist offences have taken on various shapes: new criminal offences have 
been added, extraterritorial legal competences have been introduced and/or 
more severe penalties have been introduced for specific offences. 
This chapter offers an overview of legal instruments at the disposal of the 
seven countries. We have used publicly available information to attempt to 
determine which of these instruments are being applied and how often, as 
well as looking at relevant case law. Our inventory shows that in spite of 
changes to criminal law, certain difficulties persist. For example, govern-
ments and courts find it difficult to establish what activities persons who 
travelled to Syria/Iraq have been engaged in. The available information 
allows for the tentative conclusion that prosecutions mainly centre on 
adherence to a foreign terrorist organisation, and to a lesser degree target 
specific activities engaged in abroad. 
3.2  The Netherlands 
According to the Public Prosecution Service (OM), indications that a person 
intends to travel out require a swift and coercive response.
2
 If there is 
reasonable suspicion that a person intends to travel out, this person is 
arrested as a suspect. The Public Prosecution Service holds case discussions 
to look at these instances and initiates criminal prosecution in case of a 
criminal offence. In other words, arrests made on the grounds of a suspected 
                                                                
1 Verenigde Naties 2014. 





intention to travel out do not always lead to criminal prosecution. In October 
2013, persons were convicted for the first time in the Netherlands for pre-
paring to travel to Syria.
3
 Omar H. was sentenced to 12 months in prison of 
which four months were suspended, while Mohammed G. was ruled not to 
be criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder and was committed to 
a psychiatric hospital for the duration of one year.
4
 
The cases of H. and G. involved charges of committing a terrorist offence or 
making preparations to this effect (article 134a), but the court did not accept 
these charges. H. was convicted on the ground of making preparations to 
commit arson, making preparations to cause an explosion and disseminating 
texts or images inciting to violence against the public authority.
5
 G. was 
found guilty of making preparations to commit murder.
6
 In the case of H., 
the Public Prosecution Service appealed. In January of 2015, the court at The 
Hague upheld the original verdict, but did convict H. on the basis of article 
134a, specifically for acquiring the means to commit a terrorist offence.
7
 
In 2014, the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) argued for a 
general ban on travelling to IS (Islamic State)-held areas, stating this would 
make it more difficult to travel out and would ensure the automatic pro-
secution of returnees. Exceptions could be made in the case of journalists 
and aid workers active in such areas. To justify the proposal, then member of 
Parliament for the VVD Klaas Dijkhoff referred to difficulties in gathering 
sufficient evidence to convict people who travelled out to Syria/Iraq and 
were suspected of having committed crimes there.
8
 This proposed ban did 
not become law. 
The Netherlands initiates criminal investigations against all known travell-
ers. According to the Ministry of Security and Justice, at the end of Novem-
ber 2016 there were an estimated 365 ongoing criminal investigations in 
connection with jihadism against around 415 suspects.
9
 This included invest-
                                                                
3 Van Kampen 2013. 
4 Rechtbank Rotterdam 2013a; Rechtbank Rotterdam 2013b. 
5 Rechtbank Rotterdam 2013a. 
6 Rechtbank Rotterdam 2013b. 
7 Gerechtshof Den Haag 2015. 
8 De Volkskrant 2014a; RTL Nieuws 2014. 





igations against suspects who according to the police or the Public Pro-
secution Service were staying in areas of conflict in Syria/Iraq. The Minister 
of Security and Justice emphasised that there are files on all known travellers 
in case they return to the Netherlands.
10
 As a rule, returnees are detained 
and prosecuted as speedily as possible.
11
  
Maher H. was the first returnee to go on trial in the Netherlands. In late 
2015, he was found guilty in court of preparing to commit murder and man-
slaughter for terrorist ends and of incitement to terrorist offences.
12
 Pro-
secution has also been found to be possible after a person has travelled out as 
well as before they have returned. In the so-called ‘Context’ case, the sus-
pects Anis Z. and Hatim R. were sentenced in absentia to six years in prison 
in December 2015, while they were possibly still in Syria.
13
 
Persons suspected of or convicted for terrorist offences are committed to a 
specialised Terrorist Prison Wing.
14
 The Public Prosecution Service does 
not comment on the number of convicted returnees. The Ministry of Security 
and Justice did state in October 2016 that a large number of returnees ‘have 
found a place’ in Dutch society again.
15
  
3.3  Belgium 
Belgium, too, allows for legal measures against would-be Syria travellers. 
As early as August 2004, article 140 of the Belgian Criminal Code penalised 
financing terrorism, participating in the activities of a terrorist group and 
leading a terrorist group. In March 2013, this was expanded to the following 
activities if carried out for terrorist purposes: public incitement to violence, 
recruitment, providing training and undergoing training.
16
 
In April 2014, a legislative proposal to amend the (inactive) Mercenary Act 
in order to make travelling to areas of conflict in Syria/Iraq a punishable 
                                                                
10 NOS 2016a. 
11 Openbaar Ministerie undated. 
12 Rechtbank Den Haag 2014. 
13 Rechtbank Den Haag 2015. 
14 Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid and 
ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 2014, p. 5. 
15 RTL Nieuws 2016. 






offence was defeated with the argument that existing counter-terrorism 
legislation covered this sufficiently.
17
 Following the Paris attacks of January 
2015 and the antiterrorist action in Verviers, counter-terrorism legislation 
was amended after all. Article 140sexies of the Criminal Code entered into 
force in August 2015, making travelling abroad for terrorist purposes a 




A recent case in which the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office instigated pro-
secution in view of suspected travel for terrorist purposes concerns the trial 
against eight members of the Way of Life-movement.
19
 Those members who 
managed to travel out were charged with participation in the activities of a 
terrorist group. Those members who did not manage to reach Syria/Iraq 
were charged with attempted participation in the activities of a terrorist 
group.
20
 The same basis for prosecution was previously used in the Sharia4-
Belgium (S4B)-trial, the largest terrorism trial in Belgium so far.  
In February 2015, the judge ruled that S4B and the groups the S4B-members 
joined in Syria are terrorist organisations.
21
 In consequence of this ruling, the 
great majority of the 46 defendants were convicted (often in absentia) for 
participation in or leadership of a terrorist organisation and were handed 
prison sentences ranging from 40 months to 15 years.
22
 In another large trial 
against the so-called ‘Filière syrienne’ or ‘Zerkani’ network, 32 persons 
went on trial for recruitment for the war in Syria, for travelling to Syria or 
for attempting to do so. Prison sentences in this trial ranged from ten months 
to 20 years.  
February 2017 was the first time a judge handed down a ruling in a trial 
against travellers for specific terrorist offences committed in Syria. As early 
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as 2003 it became legally possible to prosecute Belgians, or persons whose 
primary country of residence is Belgium, who commit terrorist offences ab-
road.
23
 For example, five persons were charged with involvement in de-
capitation and a sixth person (Hakim E.) was charged with the execution of a 
prisoner.
24
 All defendants were charged with murder with a terrorist motive, 
with the public prosecutor seeking the maximum penalty of 30 years plus 15 
years’ detention under a hospital order.
25
 E. stood trial for execution and was 
eventually convicted to a prison sentence of 28 years plus 10 years’ deten-
tion under a hospital order. He was also the only defendant to have actually 
been arrested. The other five, who are probably still in Syria or have since 




Prosecution can also take place when a person has left the area of conflict 
in Syria/Iraq but (presumably) has not yet returned to Belgium or to Europe. 
One defendant in the aforementioned S4B-trial contested his conviction in 
absentia. The judge reached a new verdict in June 2015, handing down a 
prison sentence of 12 years and a fine of 30,000 euros. It was assumed that 
the man was no longer in Syria at the time, although he had no known place 
of residence in Europe.
27
 
With regard to the criminal prosecution of returnees, the Belgian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs stated in 2014 that not all returnees are detained and that 
the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office first looks into all aspects of the 
files.
28
 However, in the wake of the attacks in Paris in November 2015 the 
Prime Minister of Belgium declared that returnees belong in prison.
29
 Conse-
quently, returnees in Belgium are detained, interviewed and in most cases 
remanded in custody. Where possible, the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office 
will instigate criminal prosecution.  
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As per mid-2015, the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office was carrying out 
criminal or judicial investigations into about 60 returnees. These persons are 
suspected of having ‘fought or otherwise participated in the activities of ter-
rorist organisations’ in Syria or Iraq.
30
 In various cases in 2015 and 2016, the 
Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office sought prison sentences of up to six years 
against returnees, which resulted in corresponding convictions.
31
 
In case of a conviction on the basis of the aforementioned counter-terrorism 
legislation, Belgian courts can strip naturalised Belgians of their Belgian 
nationality. The range of terrorist offences to which this measure applies was 
broadened by decree in July 2015, a move stemming from the 12-Point Plan. 
The revocation of nationality returns in chapter four.
32
 
3.4  Denmark 
In 2002 the law was amended to make terrorist acts a punishable offence. 
Such acts included direct and indirect support (financial or otherwise) of ter-
rorist activities and participation in a terrorist organisation.
33
 A legislative 
amendment in July 2016 raised the maximum penalty for participation in ter-
rorist organisations from six to ten years.
34
 In 2006, recruitment, training and 
undergoing training were added as punishable terrorist activities.
35
 
In December 2015, the Danish parliament passed a law allowing for Danish 
subjects who join a terrorist organisation abroad to be sentenced to ten years’ 
imprisonment and even to life imprisonment in case of specific aggravating 
circumstances. The legal basis underpinning this legislation is treason. The 
law can only be invoked in cases where Danish subjects participate in a con-
flict in which the Danish state is also involved directly or indirectly.
36
 
Since July 2016, the government can decree a general travel ban to foreign 
regions in which terrorist organisations are involved in a conflict. Danish 
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subjects, diplomats excepted, who want to travel to such regions in spite of 
the ban need to seek permission from the government.
37
 The act was adopted 
in order to toughen the response to ‘fremmedkrigerne’ or foreign fighters. In 
June 2016, the Minister of Justice reported that proceedings had been opened 




In contrast to most of the countries included in this study, travelling out in 
the context of committing terrorist offences has not been made a punishable 
offence in Denmark. Nevertheless, June 2016 saw the first conviction of a 
traveller.
39
 Hamza C. went to Syria twice in 2013 and wanted to travel there 
again in 2015, but his passport was seized. He was remanded in detention 
and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment for participating in and lending 
financial support to a terrorist organisation, IS in this case; the public pro-
secutor had demanded six years.
40
 Leaked IS membership lists were a key 
exhibit used by the prosecutor to argue that C. had joined IS, a contention he 
denied for a long time.
41
  
3.5  Germany 
German criminal law is harnessed in several ways to deal with actual and po-
tential travellers and returnees. Participation in a terrorist organisation was 
made a criminal offence as early as 1976.
42
 This act was passed at the time in 
response to the violent actions of the Red Army Faction (RAF). A legislative 
change in 2002 added the possibility of being convicted of membership in 
foreign terrorist organisations.
43
 In March 2016, criminal investigations on 
the basis of both articles were on-going against 202 persons suspected of tra-
velling out to Syria/Iraq.
44
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The first sentence for participation in the conflict in Syria as an IS-fighter 
was handed down on the basis of membership in a terrorist organisation. In 
December 2014, 20-year-old Kreshnik B. was sentenced to three years and 
nine months’ imprisonment. The measure of severity of the sentence was 
based on juvenile law.
45
 In October 2016, Kerim Marc B. was sentenced to 
six years and nine months’ imprisonment for membership in a terrorist 
organisation. Although B. contested the charge that he had participated in 
fighting in Syria, the court considered it proven on the basis of B.’s tele-
phone and chat conversations. B. was sentenced as an adult in view of his 
actions, even though juvenile law still applied to him at the start of his 
criminal offences. As a mitigating circumstance for the sentence, the court 
noted that B. is taking part in an exit programme.
46
 
Since 2009, it has been a criminal offence to carry out individual prepara-
tory acts in the context of terrorist activities (article 89a). This involves pre-
paring a severe, subversive act, including by instructing others, or receiving 
instruction, in the use of weapons and explosives, making weapons and 
explosives available and providing funds for carrying out such an act. The 
preparation of a subversive act is also an offence if it occurs abroad.
47
 In 
June 2015, travelling out was added to article 89a as a punishable offence in 
the context of preparing a subversive act.
48
 In March 2016, criminal investi-
gations on the basis of this article were ongoing against 387 persons suspect-
ed of travelling out to Syria/Iraq.
49
 The ban on preparatory acts in the con-
text of a terrorist organisation (article 89b) is also used. In March 2016, 
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An interesting case is that against Ali R., who is currently standing trial for 
membership in a terrorist organisation (articles 129a and 129b).
51
 According 
to media reports, the public prosecutor also wants to prosecute R. for 
preparing a subversive act (article 89a). In R.’s case, this act reportedly has a 
bearing not on Germany but on the Syrian regime headed by President Bas-
har al-Assad.
52
 R., however, claims he travelled to Syria against his wishes 
in order to be with his wife and children. According to him, travelling out 
was his wife’s initiative. Another factor is that R. allegedly worked as an 
informer for the German intelligence and security service; see also chapter 
eight on Military engagement and assistance with repatriation.
53
 
Laws on terrorist offences are not the only measures that are being marshal-
led. In March 2016, the public prosecutor considered prosecuting Anis Amri 
– who committed the attack on the Christmas market in December 2016 – on 
the basis of article 89a. The public prosecutor decided not to do this due to 
insufficient evidence and to continue the possible case against Amri on the 




Recruitment for foreign military service (article 109h), a proscribed activity 
since 1957, is also used to prosecute those who travel out to Syria/Iraq. In 
March 2016, this article turned out to provide the basis for nine criminal 
investigations.
55
 Lastly, in August 2016 a proposal was mooted to make 
incitement for committing terrorist offences a criminal offence.
56
 This pro-
posal was part of a larger range of wishes presented in the wake of the three 
violent incidents in July 2016, two of which were linked to IS.
57
 The current 
status of the proposal is unknown. 
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3.6  France 
French penal law has long provided for powers to move against actual or 
suspected terrorism. Since 1996, the core of these powers has been the so-
called ‘association de malfaiteurs en relation avec une entreprise terroriste’ – 
hereinafter called the malfaiteurs-article. This article permits the authorities 
to act in the case of preparatory acts committed in a group in the context of 
seeking to commit terrorist offences.
58
 Between 2012 and April 2016, an 




The malfaiteurs-article is used in all phases, from would-be or actual travel-
ling to returning. For example, in 2014 three men – including Youssef E., 
also discussed in chapter five on Other restrictive measures – were sentenced 
to prison terms of two to four years on the basis of the malfaiteurs-article. 
The three were arrested in May 2012 at Saint-Etienne airport on suspicion of 




In the spring of 2016, the Parisian court with a nationwide brief for criminal 
cases relating to terrorist offences announced a new legal strategy. The mal-
faiteurs-article will be used more particularly in connection with the more 
severe category of ‘crimes’ rather than that of ‘délits’, the lighter category 
most used until then. A parliamentary investigation in 2015 stated that only 
ten out of 69 legal investigations into travellers to Syria/Iraq and returnees 
fell into the category of ‘crimes’. This was because in the case of ‘délits’, the 
evidence required is less stringent. The change in strategy was motivated by 
a wish to match the response to the severity of the offences committed in 
Syria/Iraq. In addition, the category of ‘crimes’ allows for a better differen-
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A legislative amendment in December 2012 enabled prosecuting acts com-
mitted outside of French borders by French citizens or by persons resident 
in France as terrorist offences.
62
 The amendment also added a number of 
activities, including recruitment, to the definition of terrorist offences. How-
ever, a parliamentary investigation in April 2015 did not find any ongoing 
trials on this basis.
63
 The investigation also pointed out the limited reach of 
the recruitment article and its overlap with both the malfaiteurs-article and 
the article we will discuss next.
64
 
In November 2014, incitement to commit terrorist offences (article 421-2-5) 
was added to the criminal statutes.
65
 Previously, this article had been part of 
the law on the freedom of the press.
66
 There were 41 convictions on the basis 
of this article between November 2014 and January 2016. As a comparison: 
there were 14 such convictions between 1994 and 2014.
67
 The extent to 
which these recent convictions relate to travellers or returnees is unknown. 
Article 421-2-5 was further differentiated in June 2016. Deliberately sending 
messages inciting to terrorist offences (article 421-2-5-1) and regularly 
accessing such messages (article 421-2-5-2) were made punishable offen-
ces.
68
 In 2011, article 421-2-5-2 had been struck down as unconstitutional.
69
 
Legal proceedings have been brought and there have been a number of 
convictions on the basis of these articles. In September 2016, a 28-year-old 
man in Marseille was handed a two-year prison sentence for accessing 
material on the Internet that incited to terrorist offences. Police arrested him 
as he was investigating how to travel to Libya via Spain.
70
 
Preparatory acts carried out by individuals (article 421-2-6) have been 
punishable since November 2014.
71
 In July 2016, the parliamentary commit-
tee of inquiry into the Paris attacks of January and November 2015 stated 
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that this latter article had so far not been used much.
72
 For example, an on-
going case in connection with article 421-2-6 was re-examined in 2015 on 
the basis of the malfaiteurs-article.
73
 A number of cases have meanwhile 
been brought before courts of law on the basis of 421-2-6, although insofar 
as is known no verdicts have yet been reached. The committee of enquiry 
did consider the article to be useful, as it allows for the penalisation of acts 
that fall outside the scope of the malfaiteurs-article, but its added value for 
combating terrorism has yet to be demonstrated.
74
 
3.7  United Kingdom 
In and of itself, travelling to Syria is not a punishable offence in the UK. 
This may explain why there were relatively few arrests in the initial stages of 
the Syrian civil war in March 2011, in spite of the participation of British 
subjects in the conflict.
75
 Persons who (potentially) seek to commit criminal 
acts in connection with travelling out can be prosecuted on the basis of the 
Terrorism Act 2000 (TA 2000) and the Terrorism Act 2006 (TA 2006).
76
 
Since the start of 2014, the British police and the Crown Prosecution Service 
(CPS) have taken a stricter approach to Syrian-related criminal offences. The 
first eight months of 2014 saw 69 Syrian-related arrests, a fivefold increase 
compared to the preceding years.
77
 Would-be travellers, as well as those who 
succeeded in leaving the UK but were returned before reaching Syria, were 
often arrested on suspicion of acting in preparation of a terrorist offence 
(TA 2006, Section 5).
78
 
As a rule, returnees are placed under arrest and it is decided in each case 
whether criminal prosecution is warranted.
79
 Suspicion of fighting for groups 
such as IS or Jabhat al-Nusra/Fatah al-Sham can lead to an indictment for 
                                                                
72 Assemblée Nationale 2016a, p. 202. 
73 Assemblée Nationale 2015, p. 101. 
74 Assemblée Nationale 2016a, p. 202. 
75 Stuart 2014, p. 10. 
76 The legal ground are: terrorism financing (TA 2000, Section 16), belonging to a ‘proscribed 
organisation’ (TA 2000, Section 11), preparation of terrorist acts (TA 2006, Section 5) or providing or 
participating in training for terrorism (TA 2006, Section 6(1) and (2)). 
77 May 2014; Prime Minister’s Office 2014. 
78 BBC 2016c. For several examples see Gander 2015; BBC 2016a; West Midlands Police 2015; Koplowitz 
2015. 







belonging to a ‘proscribed organisation’ (TA 2000, Section 11). As an 
example, at the start of 2016 a female British returnee was the first to be 
convicted for membership in IS.
80
 It will also be specifically examined whet-
her a person has undergone training for terrorist purposes or has prepared to 
commit terrorist acts.  
The first returnee in the UK to be convicted was Mashudur C. in May 2014; 
he was eventually handed a four-year prison sentence.
81
 Even though C. had 
been in Syria, he was not tried for any criminal offences he might have com-
mitted there, but rather for preparatory acts (TA 2006, Section 5) undertaken 
in the UK.  
Before 2015, options for convicting individuals for criminal acts committed 
abroad were limited.
82
 The first conviction for criminal acts committed in 
Syria occurred in November 2014, when two brothers were given prison 
sentences of four-and-a-half and three years, respectively, for attending a 
training camp in Syria for terrorist ends (TA 2006, Section 8).
83
  
The 2015 Serious Crime Act (SCA) allowed for the prosecution of pre-
paring (Section 5) and training for terrorism (Section 6) in case this takes 
place abroad.
84
 In October 2014 it was proposed to prosecute returnees on 




3.8  United States 
The criminal law approach is central to the American response to travell-
ers.
86
 The legislation with regard to terrorist offences was amended through 
the ‘Patriot Act’ shortly after the attacks of 11 September 2001 and now has 
a broad application. The circumstance of American citizens leaving for Sy-
ria did not prompt a change in this legislation. A total of 113 persons have 
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since been charged with IS-related acts on the basis of this legislation, of 
whom 60 persons so far have been found guilty.
87
 However, it seems these 
figures do not relate solely to Americans who travelled out or attempted to 
do so, but also to crimes committed in the US in the name of IS. Other 
research points at 65 charges against actual and would-be travellers, 30 of 
whom would since have been convicted.
88
 
Suspected intentions of travelling out can lead to an undercover investi-
gation, often carried out by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). This 
often takes the form of so-called sting operations, in which the FBI encoura-
ges a person to commit a criminal act. For instance, an FBI agent can pose as 
a recruiter, and if a would-be traveller takes the bait and commits a criminal 
act, he or she can be arrested and prosecuted.
89
 Research indicates that infor-




Prosecution can also take place on the basis of providing material support to 
persons suspected of terrorism or to an organisation designated a ‘Foreign 
Terrorist Organization’ (FTO).
91
 Examples of such organisations are IS and 
Jabhat al-Nusra.
92
 Material support also includes supplying personnel in the 
context of an FTO, which includes persons who intend to travel out. In Mar-
ch 2016, an American was convicted for the first time of attempting to pro-
vide material support to an FTO, in this case IS.
93
 A total of 51 of the pre-




If no criminal acts have been committed to occasion prosecution on the basis 
of counter-terrorism legislation, an alternative is the so-called Al Capone 
method: arresting the suspect for smaller offences not related to terrorism. 
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These include tax, immigration or traffic offences or providing false 
information to FBI agents.
95
 
The extensive extraterritorial jurisdiction means that criminal law can be ap-
plied not just to actual or would-be travellers but to returnees as well.
96
 Re-
search from March 2016 suggests that 27 Americans were able to get to 
Syria.
97
 Seven of them have since returned, six of whom have been detained; 
one person returned to Syria.
98
 The charges against the six range from pre-
paring an attack in the US to giving incorrect information to the FBI.  
In one case it was attempted to prosecute a returnee (Eric H.) for use of a 
weapon of mass destruction. It was later found that the weapon, a grenade 
launcher, had not been fired in the context of an FTO but in that of a rebel 
group supported by the US.
99
 The prosecutor eventually reached a deal with 
H. by which he would plead guilty to a lighter misdemeanour, namely: irre-
gularities with regard to a weapons export licence.
100
  
Lastly, the 1794 Neutrality Act prohibits Americans from committing armed 
acts against a country the US is not at war with.
101
 However, this legal basis 
is not being used in practice against travellers. After all, it would be in con-
flict with the position of the US with regard to the Syrian conflict, which is 
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4  Measures in the context of travel movements 
4.1  Introduction 
This chapter looks at measures aimed at restricting travel movements. They 
are an important ingredient in the mix of measures with which the examined 
countries are trying to get a grip on the problem of travellers and returnees. 
They involve seizing travel documents, imposing travel restrictions and re-
voking nationality. These measures are imposed to prevent people travelling 
out (either again or for the first time) as well as to prevent people returning. 
All countries already provided for the seizure of travel documents before 
travelling to and returning from Syria/Iraq came to be seen as a problem. 
There have, however, been a number of changes since. For example, some 
countries now also allow the seizure of identity cards. The US does not often 
seize travel documents, but frequently uses other measures (watchlisting) 
that have the same effect. Revoking people’s nationality has become a sub-
ject of political debate in several countries, although it seems this measure is 
only being applied to a limited degree.  
4.2  The Netherlands 
Persons about whom there is legitimate concern that they are seeking to join, 
or have joined, terrorist fighting forces are included in the Passport Flagging 
Register (RPS). This means their travel documents are flagged as qualify-
ing to be declared invalid, or they can be denied newly issued travel docu-
ments.
1
 This authorises investigative and border agencies of other European 
countries to impound flagged Dutch travel documents.
2
 This measure is 
applied both to would-be travellers and to persons suspected of already 
having travelled to jihadist areas of conflict. In the first case, the measure is 
imposed to prevent people travelling out, while in the second case the 
flagging is intended to make travel outside of the Netherlands more difficult, 
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Since December 2013, the Minister of Security and Justice has issued about 
295 requests to have a passport declared invalid or refused. Flags can be re-
moved if there no longer are legitimate concerns that a person is seeking to 
join a terrorist organisation.
4
 Legislation passed in February 2017 makes it 
possible to void passports as well as identity documents automatically if the 
Minister of Security and Justice imposes a travel ban. The bearer of the 
travel document is also included in the RPS, so that they will not be issued a 
new travel document. They do receive a replacement identity card not valid 
for travelling outside of the Schengen Area.
5
  
In February 2017, the Senate gave its approval to a proposal to forfeit the 
Dutch nationality of known Syria travellers who have joined a terrorist 
organisation. However, this measure only applies to citizens who have dual 
nationality. The measure empowers the Minister of Security and Justice to 
revoke Dutch nationality without the need for a prior criminal conviction. 
The person in question will also be declared an undesirable alien to make it 
impossible for them to travel back to the Netherlands or the Schengen Area 
legally. The decision can be appealed up to four weeks after it has been 
imposed.
6
 It should be noted that in 2015 the Council of State advised 
against adopting this proposal on the grounds that existing legislation was 
sufficient.
7
 It had already been possible since March 2016 for persons con-
victed of terrorist offences on the basis of article 134a (Criminal Code) who 
have dual nationality to be stripped of their Dutch nationality.
8
 
Known travellers who have non-EU nationality can also be declared undesir-
able aliens. In their case, the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) 
will revoke their residence status.
9
 If such persons still return to the Nether-
lands, they will be declared undesirable and will be deported. As of March 
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4.3  Belgium 
In 2014, the Belgian inner cabinet rejected a proposal to revoke the identity 
card of minors potentially seeking to travel to Syria or Iraq, arguing that the 
measure would stimulate the market in counterfeit and stolen identity 
cards.
11
 It would also be sufficient to use the Schengen Information System 
(SIS) to prevent minors from travelling out.
12
 In January 2015 – following 
the Paris attacks and the antiterrorist action in Verviers – a proposal was 
introduced to revoke identity cards and passports temporarily or to refuse 
the issuance of a new passport.
13
 The Belgian Federal Parliament adopted the 
proposal in July 2015. 
Since 2016, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is authorised to revoke tempo-
rarily the identity card of persons suspected of wanting to travel out to ‘an 
area where terrorist groups are active’.
14
 The minister can also declare the 
identity card to be temporarily invalid and can decide against issuing a new 
identity card. If a person’s identity card is revoked, the minister is obliged 
also to revoke their passport. These measures all seek to prevent people 
travelling out to Syria. If any of these measures is imposed, the person 




As concerns the revocation of nationality, the Belgian government decided 
in February 2015 that Syria travellers who have dual nationality can lose 
their Belgian nationality if they obtained it through naturalisation. In the 
original proposal, the revocation could also apply to Belgians with dual 
nationality who were born in Belgium. Currently, these people cannot be 
stripped of their Belgian nationality, as this measure would be discriminatory 
in nature. After all, it would mean a person with dual nationality would be 
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punished more severely than a person who only has Belgian nationality.
16
 In 
view of the international norm on avoiding statelessness, stripping persons 
who only have Belgian nationality of their nationality is not an option.  
The final legislative amendment was criticised as being symbolic because, it 
was argued, the measure would not be applicable to many Syria travellers. 
The Minister of Justice declared that revoking Belgian nationality is option-
al, but seldom enforced by judges.
17
 Additionally, naturalised Belgians can 
lose their Belgian nationality if convicted for terrorist offences as was men-
tioned in chapter three on Criminal law.
18
 
4.4  Denmark 
In 2013, a 17-year-old boy managed to travel to Syria. His mother had torn 
up his passport after an earlier, failed attempt, and had requested that the 
municipality block any new request for a passport. In case of such a block, a 
note is made in the passport register directing the municipality to contact the 
police if a new passport is requested. In spite of this registration, the boy was 
still able to request a new passport and to leave the country.
19
  
The first seizure of a passport of a person suspected of wanting to travel out 
took place on 16 March 2015 and concerned Hamza C. This was possible in 
view of the amendment of the passport and aliens law effected on 1 March 
2015. The amendment allowed the police to seize a person’s passport, or 
refuse to issue a new one, if there are reasons to suspect the person will take 
place in activities abroad that may threaten national security or the public 
order. The law has a sunset clause and will be active until 2020.
20
 Decisions 
taken on the basis of this amendment will be valid for one year and can be 
appealed.
21
 In October 2015, the Danish authorities confiscated the passport 
of a woman who wanted to join the Peshmerga.
22
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Denmark also allows for stripping a person of their dual nationality. This 
was one of the demands of the public prosecutor in the trial against the pre-
viously mentioned Hamza C., who was born in Denmark and also has a 
Turkish passport. The judge ruled that his bond with Denmark is stronger 
than that with Turkey and rejected the public prosecutor’s request to revoke 
his Danish nationality.
23
 This verdict was upheld during the appeals case, but 




4.5  Germany 
Passports may be declared void and seized in case of a threat to national 
security or the national interest, or in case of preparation of a ‘subversive act 
of serious violence’.
25
 A legislative amendment has allowed for the revo-
cation of identity cards since June 2015. In such cases a replacement docu-
ment is issued.
26
 Additionally, it can be ruled that identity cards may not be 
taken out of the Federal Republic if there is deemed to be a threat to national 




Prior to the introduction of a legislative amendment in 2015 allowing for the 
revocation of identity documents, it was considered to mark these documents 
to alert foreign border authorities to the fact that the holder is not allowed to 
leave Germany or the Schengen Area. This proposal was controversial and 
doubts were raised about whether foreign customs officials would under-
stand such a mark.
28
 
In 2015, there were 30 instances of passports being voided or identity cards 
being limited to specific areas.
29
 The voiding of a passport can be coupled 
with a ban on travelling out.
30
 The power to revoke travel documents and 
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issue travel bans rests with the individual German states.
31
 A travel ban can 
also be imposed during a border check if the travel document has not yet 
been placed under any restrictions. When imposed, the Passport Act must be 
invoked, and the circumstances justifying the ban must be stated.
32
 By April 
2016, travel bans had been imposed 199 times, of which 78 were still in 
force and 51 had been lifted or revoked.
33
 
In spite of the revocation of passports, there are still cases of persons who 
were able to travel out. Kerim Marc B. reached Syria in March 2013 in spite 
of the revocation of his passport and travel restrictions placed on his identity 
card.
34
 In May 2014, Hassan M., who was residing in Germany, managed to 
travel to Syria using a counterfeit identity card (see also chapter five on 
Other restrictive measures). Media reports suggested that M. used his brot-
her’s identity card to travel.
35
 
4.6  France 
France has two options for imposing a ban on travelling outwards. The first 
type of ban is imposed in the course of a legal investigation, which is add-
ressed in more detail in chapter five on Other restrictive measures.
36
 This 
instrument has been used to prevent persons travelling out. Sami Amimour, 
one of the perpetrators of the November 2015 Paris attacks, was placed 
under this form of surveillance in October 2012. He still managed to reach 
Syria, probably because he had told the authorities he lost his passport and 




The second possibility of imposing a ban on travelling out was introduced by 
the legislative amendment of November 2014. This amendment allows the 
Minister of the Interior to impose such a ban, invoking the Law on Domestic 
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Security (CSI). The ban applies to French citizens whom the government has 
legitimate reasons to suspect of wanting to leave France in order to partici-
pate in terrorist acts abroad, or of being a threat to public security on their 
return. Following the attacks of January 2015, the travel ban was implemen-
ted by decree.
38
 By April 2016 it had been imposed 308 times. In 56 cases it 
was imposed for the first time and in two cases it was imposed for the 
second time. The maximum length of a ban is six months, with a total dura-
tion not exceeding two years. The ban was appealed 56 times; seven appeals 
were deemed admissible. The admitted appeals led to the ban being revoked 
in four cases. Twenty persons failed to surrender their identity documents 




When a ban on travelling out is imposed, a person’s passport and/or identity 
card are declared void and must be surrendered to the authorities.
40
 The aut-
horities already had the power to void passports on the basis of a decree 
dating back to 7 December 1792. Considering a person to be a risk to nation-
al security is one of the grounds on which a passport can be confiscated.
41
 
Articles 214-1 and 214-2 of the immigration and asylum law also offer the 
possibility of imposing a ban on travelling out of or into France.
42
 Foreign-
ers, both EU citizens and non-EU citizens, who do not have permanent resi-
dence in France at the time of such a ban may be barred from entering 
France or ordered to leave the territory of the state if they are deemed to be a 
threat to the public order or national security. The power to impose this ban 
rests with the Minister of the Interior. This measure was applied 98 times 
between February 2015 and April 2016, 32 of which concerned EU citizens 
and 66 non-EU citizens. It is unclear whether these figures only relate to 
persons who are (possibly) active in Syria/Iraq or also to persons considered 
to be a risk to national security on other grounds. 
A legislative amendment in 1998 made it possible to revoke the nationality 
of naturalised citizens in case of a conviction for terrorist offences. There 
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are some conditions to its application, including that the person concerned 
may not become stateless and that revocation must take place within ten 
years of the person’s nationality having been conferred.
43
 This measure is 
rarely applied: there have been 21 cases of revoked nationality since 1990. 
The last eight cases, between 2000 and 2014, were all connected to terror-
ism.
44
 The French Senate is currently working on a legislative proposal that 
includes the possibility of ruling out the naturalisation of persons sentenced 
to prison terms of at least one year.
45
 Proponents of the proposal cite a 
number of travellers with a criminal past, such as Mehdi Nemmouche and 
Amédy Coulibaly. 
In 2015 the highest French court, the Constitutional Council, ruled the revo-
cation of Sahnouni’s French nationality to have been justified. Sahnouni, 
born in Morocco, was arrested in 2010 on a charge of acquiring funds for an 
organisation linked to al-Qaeda and of overseeing the recruitment of would-
be jihadists destined for Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia. He was given a 
prison sentence of seven years and was stripped of his French nationality.
46
 
Another ongoing case has been referred to the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) by five French citizens with dual nationality. In October 
2015 the French Prime Minister stripped them of their French nationality. 
Intelligence services claim they regularly moved in ‘milieux islamistes’.
47
 
The men had been convicted previously for involvement in the 2003 attacks 
in Casablanca, Morocco, but were released from prison several years ago. 
The parliamentary committee of enquiry into the Paris attacks of January and 
November 2015 asserted that ending a person’s dual nationality should not 
be a ‘taboo’ subject.
48
 
Shortly after the November 2015 attacks in Paris, a plan was launched to re-
voke the nationality of French citizens convicted of terrorist offences. The 
measure inspired a great amount of social and political protest, and President 
François Hollande abandoned the plan after the French Parliament failed to 
                                                                
43 Civil Law (Code civil), article 25 and 25-1. 
44 Jouan 2015; L’Est Républicain 2015. 
45 Sénat 2016a. 
46 Waldhorn 2015. 
47 Jacquin 2016. 




reach agreement on it.
49
 Hollande later acknowledged that the measure was 




4.7  United Kingdom 
The British government has various instruments allowing it to seize a per-
son’s passport or refuse to issue a passport, either temporarily or perman-
ently. The Home Secretary can impose travel-related measures on the basis 
of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (TPIM 
Act 2011). This includes the power to seize travel documents such as pass-
ports, to prevent a person obtaining travel documents or to impose area 
restrictions or bans. It is a criminal offence to violate any imposed condi-
tions. Travel restrictions can also be imposed with regard to foreign destina-
tions in the case of persons already convicted of terrorism-related criminal 
offences and sentenced to a prison term of over 12 months.
51
  
Secondly, the Home Secretary has the power to seize passports or refuse to 
issue them on the basis of the Royal Prerogative, a competence that was 
made more broadly applicable in April 2013. Previously, passports could 
only be seized if a person’s activities were considered to be demonstrably 
undesirable to the public interest. The new rules have set a lower burden of 
proof, with the possibility to confiscate travel documents on the basis of 
activities deemed undesirable with a view to the public interest.
52
 This com-
petence was invoked 61 times between April 2013 and December 2015.
53
 In 
order to allow for even faster action, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 
2015 (CTSA 2015) has, since September 2015, given police and the Border 
Force the competence to confiscate travel documents temporarily during bor-
der checks.
54
 They can make use of this competence in the case of persons of 
whom it is suspected that their leaving the UK is connected with terrorism-
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related activities. In such cases, passports can be held for up to 30 days on 




Additionally, the Home Secretary has the authority to strip a person of his 
or her British nationality if this is ‘conducive to the public good’ or if Brit-
ish nationality was obtained in a fraudulent manner.
56
 The 2002 Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act expanded the applicability of this restrictive 
measure by also allowing it to be applied to persons born in the UK. The 
2014 Immigration Act, enacted in response to the phenomenon of British 
citizens travelling to Syria, allows this measure to be applied to persons who 
only have British nationality. This leads to the possibility of statelessness, 
but the Home Secretary is required to make a plausible case that the person 
in question can obtain a different nationality than the British one. In 2013 
and 2014, 37 persons were stripped of their British nationality.
57
 However, 
these official figures do not record the grounds for the decisions. Research 
shows that since 2010, 33 persons have been stripped of their nationality for 
counter-terrorism purposes.
58
 In all cases this concerned persons with dual 
nationality. The increased use of this competence has been related to the 
phenomenon of British citizens travelling to Syria.
59
 In almost all cases, the 




Lastly, the CTSA 2015 provides for the imposition of a temporary area ban 
(Temporary Exclusion Order, TEO). This instrument appears to have been 
created mainly to get a grip on Britons already staying abroad, whom the 
TEO prevents from re-entering the UK.
61
 If a TEO is imposed, the British 
passport of the person concerned is also cancelled immediately. In order to 
be able to return to the UK, the traveller has to apply for a permit from the 
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4.8  United States 
The US also allows for the seizure of a person’s passport in the interest of 
national security. The Supreme Court, however, ruled that the person whose 
passport is threatened to be seized must have the opportunity to refute the 
evidence cited against them. This is no mean task, as the evidence is often 
classified in the interest of national security. Consequently, the measure of 
seizing the passport of would-be travellers is not much used.
63
  
However, frequent use is made of watchlisting, a measure where would-be 
travellers are registered in a Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB, also refer-
red to as the Watchlist), which is maintained by the FBI’s Terrorist Screen-
ing Center.
64
 The authorities are notified whenever a person on this list 
wants to leave the country by air. If there are enough indications that this 
person may commit criminal offences abroad, he or she can be placed on a 
no-fly list. Watchlisting, then, has the same effect as seizing identity docu-
ments and passports: preventing people from travelling out by air. The mea-
sure also allows for monitoring who is travelling back from the area of con-
flict. 
Work is also in progress on the International Conflicts of Concern Act 
(ICCA), a proposal that failed to gain sufficient backing in the House of Re-
presentatives in March 2014 but was resubmitted in April 2015. The ICCA 
confers powers on the President including decreeing a general travel ban for 
specific ‘countries of concern’, unless a travel permit has been applied for. 
Violating the conditions of the ICCA can lead to a fine or to criminal pro-
secution.
65
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The US has limited possibilities for revoking a person’s nationality. As per 
the Immigration and Nationality Act, American citizens can lose their na-
tionality through actions including treason.
67
 This requires a high burden of 
proof, causing it to be a difficult avenue for stripping travellers of their 
nationality. A different option for stripping a person of their nationality is 
when they join the armed forces of a state involved in hostilities against the 
US.
68
 However, as terrorist organisations are not deemed to be state actors, 
this option is not applicable to travellers. 
At various times it has been attempted to amend the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act. In 2010 and 2012, the Enemy Expatriation Act (EEA) sought 
to empower the government to strip people of their nationality in case of 
‘engaging in or purposefully and materially supporting hostilities against the 
United States’. In both cases the EEA failed to garner enough support in 
Congress.
69
 The proposal was submitted for the third time in 2015 and is 
currently being debated by the House of Representatives. Up to now, taking 
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5  Other restrictive measures 
5.1  Introduction 
In addition to measures relating to travel movements, most of the reviewed 
countries also have other restrictive measures in place. These include, for ex-
ample, financial restrictions, deportation or monitoring schemes. In a num-
ber of countries, including the Netherlands, Belgium, France and the UK, 
monitoring schemes are in use or have been modified in order to get a better 
grip on the problem of travellers and returnees. 
These restrictive measures are being applied in different ways: prior to cri-
minal prosecution; in addition to criminal law, after convicted persons have 
served their sentence; and as an alternative to criminal law. This means these 
measures have at least three functions that in most cases are intimately inter-
related: monitoring, prevention and punishment. 
5.2  The Netherlands 
As part of the financial approach, known travellers who join a terrorist 
organisation are placed on a national terrorism register. In consequence, all 
financial assets of the person in question are frozen and they are denied 
any financial services. It is a criminal offence to make money available 
directly or indirectly to a person placed on this register. Since December 
2013, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in tandem with the Minister of Finan-
ce and the Minister of Security and Justice, has placed 67 persons and three 
organisations on this register. This brought the total number of persons on 
the register to 77 by the end of 2016.
1
 Most of them are Dutch nationals who 
left for Syria or Iraq in the past years.
2
 
Travellers are also immediately removed from the Municipal Personal 
Records Database (BRP). The qualifying institution – such as the police or 
the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) – notifies the muni-
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cipality of the fact of a person travelling out; the municipality then removes 
the person from the BRP. This cancels the person’s right to social benefits, 
allowances and study grants.
3
 
Returnees can also be placed under supervision. Supervision orders can be 
imposed as part of a criminal law response, with the judge imposing a 
(wholly or partially) suspended sentence including probation. Following a 
prison term of at least one year, it is also possible to grant a convict con-
ditional release.
4
 In November 2015, the Senate approved an act extending 
the supervision periods of persons released from detention under a hospital 
order and other persons convicted of sex crimes and violent crimes. The 
Comprehensive Action Programme to Combat Jihadism referred to this act 
as one of the avenues for long-term surveillance of returnees.
5
 Parts of the 
act entered into force on 1 January 2017, while other parts will enter into 
force on 1 January 2018.
6
 Among other things it provides for: admission to a 
care institution with mandatory treatment, assisted living, restraining orders, 
area bans, notification requirements, travel bans, participation in behavioural 
interventions and electronic surveillance. The measures are imposed for a 
number of years, with the possibility of extension, up to lifelong extension.
7
 
In February 2017 the Temporary Administrative Counter-Terrorism Measur-
es Bill was passed.
8
 This has made it possible to take administrative mea-
sures in response to ‘behaviour that can be linked to terrorist activities or 
support for such activities’.
9
 The bill provides for notification requirements, 
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area bans and restraining orders. These measures can only be applied if there 
is a threat to national security.  
5.3  Belgium 
Belgium initially considered the use of electronic tagging for persons regi-
stered with the Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (OCAD). This was 
one of the measures of the 18-Point Plan presented in November 2015. The 
plan proposed mandatory electronic tagging for persons registered with the 
threat analysis services.
10
 However, in the case of returnees it was announ-
ced that they would be detained upon returning to Belgium.
11
 Electronic 
surveillance would be an alternative only if detention was not possible or 
desirable, for instance in the case of persons believed not to have taken part 
in fighting.
12
 In connection with this, the Minister of Justice issued a direct-
ive to exempt convicted returnees from electronic surveillance.
13
 This move 
replaced a prior proposal to oblige all returnees to wear an electronic tag. 
The decision followed on the November 2015 Paris attacks, which led the 
government to conclude that a ‘visible, hands-on’ approach would no longer 
be sufficient in the case of returnees.
14
 
Travellers can have their financial assets frozen. This is one of the mea-
sures of the 12-Point Plan presented in January 2015. In September 2015, the 
Belgian National Security Council (NVR) approved the circular detailing 
this procedure.
15
 On the basis of this circular, the OCAD can pass on details 
about persons and entities linked to terrorist offences to the NVR, which will 
include these details on a register. Definitive inclusion has to be approved by 
the Council of Ministers and allows for the assets of persons and entities to 
be frozen. In November 2016 there were 27 names on this list.
16
 They main-
ly involved people believed to be associated with the perpetrators of the 
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In principle, people who travel to Syria are taken off the population regi-
ster.
18
 This, too, has financial consequences: among other things, persons re-
moved from the register lose their right to social benefits. As concerns the 
National Register, the intention is to keep returnees registered, in contrast 
with persons travelling out. According to the Cabinet, ‘This is the only way 
for the police to keep them under surveillance’.
19
 
5.4  Denmark 
A legislative proposal is currently being debated that allows travellers who 
participate in armed conflict abroad to be barred from social security.
20
 The 
proposals follows on two cases of travellers active in Syria who were found 
still to have access to the social services of the Danish state. In November 
2014, the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET), revealed that at 
least 15 Danish nationals who were active in Syria were claiming social 
benefits. This came to the fore following a comparison of documents from 
different government bodies.
21
 In December 2016, Ekstra Bladet revealed 
that 36 travellers received social benefits while active in Syria.
22
 
5.5  Germany 
Following a 2009 ruling by the ECHR, the monitoring scheme for released 
prisoners was reformed. Since 2011, an electronic tag can be imposed on 
convicts sentenced to a minimum prison term of three years and who it is 
believed will continue to be a danger to society or their direct environment 
upon their release.
23
 The built-in GPS transmitter allows for uninterrupted 
monitoring of the wearer of an electronic tag. This measure has been im-
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posed 88 times, mainly on persons convicted of sex crimes or of having 
committed serious violence.
24
 Additionally, the state of Hesse has had a trial 
since 2000 involving a ‘kleine Fußfessel’, or small ankle monitor, as a sub-
stitute for a prison sentence and to aid reintegration into society.
25
 Courts 
can order this small electronic tag to be worn.
26
  
There have been a number of incidents over the past years involving wearers 
of electronic tags. In 2008, Rafik Y., a German resident originally from Iraq, 
was sentenced to five years in prison for membership in a terrorist organi-
sation. Upon his release, Y. was fitted with an electronic tag, but in October 
2015 he stabbed a policewoman in Berlin before being shot dead by police.
27
 
Another wearer of a small electronic tag, Hassan M., travelled to Syria in the 
spring of 2014. Two criminal trials were ongoing against M., one for causing 
bodily harm and another for attempted burglary.
28
 In contrast to the standard 
electronic tag, the small model only registers whether the wearer has been in 
a designated location at specific times. M. is believed to have been killed in 
Syria in 2016.
29
 In 2013 another person fitted with a small electronic tag had 




Since the end of 2015, politicians have repeatedly called for the use of elec-
tronic tags against Jihadist ‘Gefährder’ (persons considered a threat to public 
safety). Introducing an electronic tag for Jihadists again became a topical 
issue after the three violent incidents in July 2016, two of which were linked 
to IS, and the Berlin Christmas market attack in December 2016.
31
 
Foreign nationals can be deported on the basis of the residence act if they 
are deemed a threat to public safety or the public order.
32
 The states have 
powers to deport people, provided their decisions are supported by a fact 
file. If a case is considered to be of particular importance, the federal govern-
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In February 2016, deportation had been considered for Anis Amri, the perpe-
trator of the Berlin Christmas market attack in December of that year. The 
deportation procedure was aborted due to a lack of evidence. Deportation 
was again found not to be an option at the end of July, as Amri was not in 
possession of the right travel documents. A person needs to be positively id-
entified in order to be deported. In October the consulate of Tunisia, Amri’s 
country of birth, rejected a request for replacement travel documents, as 
Amri was not on their file. A new request was submitted as part of the de-




The federal government is aiming to make the residence act more stringent 
in order to be able to actually deport foreign nationals designated Gefähr-
der.
35
 A proposal has since been presented. The subject of deportation of for-
eign nationals was already on the agenda as one of the measures proposed 
following the violent incidents in July 2016.
36
 
5.6  France 
France has a broad scale of restrictive measures that investigating judges can 
impose on suspects in the course of a judicial investigation into a crime. 
These include area restrictions, house arrest, notification requirements, sur-
rendering one’s identity document, a ban on contact with specific persons 
and a ban on specific activities. A number of these measures have been im-
posed in concrete cases to limit actual and would-be travellers and returnees 
in their freedom of movement and activity. 
The previously mentioned Samy Amimour, one of the perpetrators of the 
November 2015 Paris attacks, was able to travel to Syria in September 2013 
in spite of restrictive measures that included surrendering his passport and a 
weekly notification requirement, although this requirement was not really 
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followed up in practice.
37
 On two occasions in 2015, Adel Kermiche tried 
and failed to travel to Syria. He was detained after the second time, but in the 
spring of 2016 he was allowed to serve the remainder of his sentence at 
home, wearing an electronic tag. Kermiche was allowed to leave the paren-
tal home in the morning only, and it was on one of these occasions that he 
and Abdel Malik Petitjean attacked the church in his home town, Saint-
Etienne-du-Rouvray, in July 2016.
38
 
Foreign nationals suspected of terrorist offences can be placed under house 
arrest pursuant to the provisions of immigration law.
39
 This provision was 
only used on seven occasions.
40
 As concerns entry bans, exit bans and house 
arrest for foreign nationals, it is unclear in which phases these measures are 
being applied. 
Electronic monitoring as a response to jihadism is seeing only limited use. 
While in 2016 a number of 10,642 persons were serving a sentence in this 
way, only 13 persons wore electronic tags in cases related to ‘terrorisme is-
lamiste’, six of whom had been convicted and seven of whom were awaiting 
sentencing.
41
 A legislative amendment in June 2016 empowers the Minister 
of the Interior in tandem with the Paris public prosecutor to subject returnees 
to restrictions in the context of the Law on Domestic Security (CSI). These 
include area restrictions, notification requirements (both for a maximum 
duration of one month, with two possibilities for extension) and/or manda-
tory reporting of a person’s residence and refraining from contact with per-
sons deemed a threat to public safety (for a maximum duration of three 
months, with the possibility for a once-only extension). These measures can 
be appealed.
42
 A current legislative proposal seeks to limit the circumstances 
in which these restrictions can be lifted.
43
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38 Piel and Seelow 2016; Willsher and Borger 2016. 
39 CESEDA, article L563-1. 
40 Assemblée Nationale 2016a, pp. 257-258. 
41 Boscher 2016. 
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Imprisoned convicts, including those convicted for terrorist offences, are no 
longer entitled to social security.
44
 This also applies to persons travelling to 
Syria or Iraq from the moment it is learnt that they are no longer in France. 
People can be denied social security because this provision is not linked to 
having French nationality, but rather to whether one is staying in French 
territory. In 2014, 290 Syria travellers were stripped of their right to social 
security.
45
 Some political and media controversy arose in early October 2016 
when it was found that Farouk Ben Abbes, considered a ‘[f]igure de l’islam-
isme radical’ and associated with an attack in Egypt in 2009, was receiving 
social security benefits while under house arrest. Whether a person is con-
sidered a threat turned out not to be a criterion in deciding whether they are 
entitled to social security.
46
 
Restrictions can also be enforced on the basis of the state of emergency that 
continued until 1 November 2017, having been extended several times since 
being declared after the attacks of November 2015. The state of emergency 
provides for measures including: placing individuals under house arrest (271 
ongoing house arrests in February 2016), house searches, area restrictions 
(540 restrictions in effect in July 2016), closing specific locations, banning 
specific meetings and deporting persons who may pose a threat to national 
security or the public order.
47
  
The provisions of the state of emergency have also been applied to travellers 
and returnees. For example, Youssef E. was placed under house arrest 
following the November 2015 Paris attacks. His house arrest came into 
effect one month after he was released, having served a sentence for attempt-
ting to travel to Syria in May 2012.
48
 However, it is not clear how many of 
the measures imposed on the basis of the state of emergency are connected 
with actual or would-be travellers or returnees. Research has pointed out the 
very broad applicability of the state of emergency, not only with regard to 
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concerns about jihadism but also with regard to the international climate 
conference in Paris in 2016.
49
  
The state of emergency also allows for the deportation of foreign nationals. 
In March 2016 two cases of deportation were reported and three pertinent 
investigations were ongoing.
50
 Deportation can also take place on the basis 
of immigration law.
51
 Figures from December 2016 refer to 60 deportations 
of foreign jihadists since 2012, 17 of which took place in 2016. By com-
parison, in the early 2000s there were about ten deportations a year.
52
 It is 
not clear which powers are invoked with which frequency to carry out de-
portations. The motive behind deportations is often based on information 
from the intelligence services. A deportation order can be appealed, but ac-
cording to the newspaper Le Figaro there are cases where the government 
acts so fast that appealing the order is no longer an option.
53
 Deportation pro-
cedures are complex as it is not always easy to establish the identity of the 
person to be deported. Moreover, an agreement must be reached with the 
state the person is to be deported to, a process that can take months.
54
 Lastly, 
deportation is not always an option, as the ECHR prohibits subjecting any-
one to torture or degrading treatment.
55
 
Lastly, in the wake of the November 2015 attacks preventive detention was 
proposed as a measure against persons suspected of having been radicalised 
and registered as such on the ‘Fiche S’, a national register of persons wanted 
for or suspected of various activities. So far, this suggestion has never reach-
ed the status of a formal legislative proposal. The Council of State ruled that 
the concept would constitute a grave violation of constitutional rights.
56
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5.7  United Kingdom 
The UK, too, provides for electronic monitoring, which is one of the Terror-
ism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs). Other TPIMs include 
restraining orders, restrictions on the use of computers and telephones, 
financial restrictions, police station notification requirements, mandatory 
moves and the travel measures mentioned in chapter four. The TPIMs were 
introduced in 2011 to replace Control Orders, with the argument that they 
provide a better balance between a person’s rights and freedoms on the one 
hand and the need to protect society from the possible danger posed by the 
person on the other hand.
57




Before a TPIM can be imposed, the Home Secretary first has to confer with 
police and the judiciary on whether there is sufficient evidence for a criminal 
law approach. TPIMs can only be used if the evidence is insufficient for cri-
minal prosecution.
59
 This goes a long way towards explaining the limited use 
of TPIMs: as of October 2016 there were TPIMs in place against six per-
sons, five of whom were Britons.
60
 While these restrictive measures have 
seen limited use, there has been a considerable increase in criminal prosecut-
ions over the past years.
61
 
Those TPIMs that can be imposed to prevent a person travelling out can also 
be imposed on returnees. The CTSA 2015 offers additional instruments to 
‘improve [the] ability to manage [foreign fighters] on their return’, including 




Moreover, the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) of the 
Treasury can freeze the assets of travellers (as well as of organisations) by 
placing them on a ‘consolidated list’. The OFSI list includes all persons and 
organisations that are on the EU’s terrorism list. The legal basis for these 
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measures is provided by the 2010 Terrorist Asset Freezing Act. Anyone 




By September 2014 the Treasury had placed 33 names on the list: 25 persons 
and eight organisations.
64
 This is a decrease compared to previous years, as 
the number of persons the government removes from the list exceeds the 
number of persons being added. Most of the persons listed by OFSI in 2014 
concerned those suspected involvement in terrorism in Syria and Iraq. They 
were placed on the list after having been identified in a video made by IS.
65
  
5.8  United States 
Measures against persons travelling out of the United States seem to be 
limited to measures relating to travel movements, as described in the pre-
vious chapter. The absence of other restrictive measures appears to under-
score the preference for a criminal law approach to Syria travellers.  
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6  Social interventions 
6.1  Introduction 
This chapter looks at social interventions aimed at actual and would-be tra-
vellers and returnees. We wish to make two observations with regard to the 
use of this category of interventions. Firstly, this chapter does not purport to 
provide an exhaustive overview of measures in this area: rather, the empha-
sis is on a number of examples of person-specific interventions. Policy aim-
ed at communities falls outside of this scope. A number of social interven-
tions go back to the period before the phenomenon of persons travelling to 
Syria and Iraq and returning from these countries became a prominent issue 
at the end of 2012.  
These measures involve supervision programmes in which a person receives 
coaching to try to help them reintegrate into society. Such programmes can 
be used to try to prevent people travelling out but also to coach returnees. 
We mention these initiatives as an example of the range of measures being 
developed and applied with regard to actual and would-be travellers and 
returnees in addition to criminal and restrictive measures. 
Secondly, the category of social interventions has a broad definition and in-
cludes situations in which the police or security services have conversations 
with persons suspected of wanting to travel out. This type of intervention has 
taken place in Germany, France, the US and other countries. 
6.2  The Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, would-be travellers and returnees are being monitored in 
the context of a local, person-specific approach to extremism and terrorism. 
This approach is not uniform across Dutch municipalities, but consists in 
principle of multidisciplinary case discussions led by the municipality. It is 
decided on an individual basis what form of monitoring is most effective. 





part of this approach.
1
 In such cases, the person’s immediate environment is 
warned on the mayor’s instructions in order to prevent the person travelling 
out.
2
 If considered necessary, the individual approach can also comprise 




In 2014, the Dutch government announced an exit facility to be established 
for persons who want to distance themselves from jihadism.
4
 The exit 
facility – called Exits – has been in operation since October 2015 and is cur-
rently in its pilot phase. This form of supervision occurs on a voluntary 
basis. Persons may be signed up to it through such channels as the Radicali-
sation Family Support Centre or the municipality.
5
 Exits is supplementary to 
the rehabilitation trajectories that can be imposed as part of a criminal law 
trajectory. The Exits-programme is run by an independent foundation and 
currently has ‘several strands’, comprising both would-be travellers and re-
turnees.
6
 Coaching takes the form of a buddy system aimed at sustained and 
intensive contact.  
6.3  Belgium 
In Belgium, a person’s immediate environment is warned if he or she is sus-
pected of wanting to travel out, in order that travel may be prevented. The 
precise way in which this is done is decided by the Local Task Force (LTF) 
concerned.
7
 Would-be travellers are also contacted themselves in their place 
of residence, initially by the local police force. This is, in principle, an exam-
ple of the ‘visible, hands-on’ approach: the person in question can and 
should know that he or she is being watched. The aim is to be in personal 
touch with the would-be traveller at least once a month; preferably, the con-
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tact person is the police officer on the beat. An exception to this approach 
can be made if it is considered necessary not to alert or alarm the person in 
question, in which case they can be monitored discreetly.
8
 
Apart from the criminal law approach, the management of would-be travel-
lers and returnees takes place at the local level. Returnees are registered with 
the relevant municipalities, which take action in the context of a person-
specific approach.
9
 This could include an integration trajectory, psychologi-
cal support, interventions from social services and/or the engagement of pre-
vention workers and the police.
10
 The municipality of Vilvoorde, for instan-
ce, has a coaching/mentoring programme for young people exposed to radi-
calisation, and free psychological assistance for would-be travellers and their 
families.  
The municipality of Antwerp also offers a tailor-made exit programme, and 
the majority of Belgian municipalities have similar programmes.
11
 In few 
cases, the government seems to have assisted people with finding a new 
job.
12
 Supervision can also take place if a criminal law approach results in a 
person’s conditional release. In these cases Flemish houses of justice, which 
offer rehabilitation services similar to the Dutch services, provide super-
vision aimed at deradicalisation.
13
 Nevertheless, following up on would-be 
travellers and returnees through social programmes only seems to take place 
to a limited extent. In the past two years, ‘hardly any’ returnees were super-
vised by the Flemish houses of justice.
14
 
6.4  Denmark 
After several dozen young people left for Syria in 2013, the social services 
of Aarhus municipality took action in cooperation with the police. The so-
called Aarhus model is aimed both at the prevention of radicalisation and at 
reintegration into society. The target group consists of would-be travellers 
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and returnees from Syria/Iraq and, in the case of returnees, is not limited to 
persons who participated in the armed struggle. Participants are entitled to 
psychological assistance, healthcare, a personal mentor and/or support with 
starting education and training.
15
 This approach has since become the natio-
nal standard.
16
 Would-be travellers and returnees only qualify for assistance 
with reintegration if there is no case for criminal prosecution and the PET 
does not consider them to be a risk to national security.
17
 
6.5  Germany 
German police engage in so-called ‘Gefährder-Ansprachen’: contacting per-
sons seen as a risk to public security and the public order with a view to pre-
venting them from committing crimes.
18
 This is an established form of 
preventive intervention used in the case of left-wing and right-wing extrem-
ists, football hooligans and people who have served a sentence for sex 
crimes and who are believed to be at risk of reoffending. This form of inter-




These Ansprachen have also taken place in the case of travellers. In 2013, 
the security service of the state of Schleswig-Holstein reported that it spoke 
with would-be travellers about their plans and has managed in this way to 
prevent people travelling out.
20
 In Cologne in June 2016, police carried out 
an Ansprache with a 16-year-old Syrian refugee who reputedly wanted to die 
in the name of IS; the boy was arrested in September of that year.
21
 
A range of NGOs in various states offer programmes for the prevention of 
radicalisation and for deradicalisation. Among other things, the programmes 
of the ‘Beratungsstellen’, as these NGOs are called, offer person-specific su-
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pervision to actual and would-be travellers, returnees and others.
22
 For ex-
ample, Kerim Marc B. is taking part in an exit programme.
23
  
In October 2016, the state of North Rhine-Westphalia reported a growing de-
mand for consultation or ‘Beratung’ with regard to ‘Salafismus’. About 200 
young people are receiving this kind of supervision and five new centres will 
be opened in addition to the eight existing ones, as reported by Ruhr Nach-
richten.
24
 The Violence Prevention Network (VPN), an NGO active through-
out the federal republic, runs deradicalisation programmes in prisons. Kresh-
nik B. seems to have followed such a programme successfully.
25
 The VPN is 
also active outside of prisons. Reportedly, the network currently provides 
support in about 60 cases where people are at imminent risk of travelling out 
or have already returned.
26
 
6.6  France 
The domestic security service, the General Directorate of Domestic Security  
(DGSI), interviews persons suspected of planning to travel to Syria. Ami-
mour, for example, was visited by the DGSI in October 2012.
27
 
Countering radicalisation is a fairly new policy area in France: the first ini-
tiatives at the national level were taken in 2014. Rehabilitation programmes 
have since been set up locally. The city of Mulhouse, for example, has had a 
programme for radicalised persons and persons at risk of radicalisation since 
September 2015. This programme can be employed at various stages: as an 
alternative to prosecution, prior to a trial, as part of a judicial investigation 
and as a punitive measure. The intervention is carried out by a team con-
sisting of psychologists, educational workers and social workers.
28
 It is not 
clear to what extent the programme is tailored to (would-be) travellers and 
returnees. 
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6.7  United Kingdom 
In the UK, would-be travellers can be referred to the Channel programme, 
which forms part of the Prevent strategy.
29
 Syria-related referrals mostly take 
the form of one-on-one conversations with a professional who measures his 
findings against a number of risk factors. Where needed, the professional 
also considers which other services are needed to provide further support to 
the referred individual.
30
 In the case of returnees for whom criminal prose-
cution is not an option, it will also be considered whether to follow up on 
them through Prevent. Specific reference in this context is made to the Chan-




Additionally, in 2015 the Home Affairs Committee recommended that the 
government implement a second programme comparable to Channel and 
tailored for returnees.
32
 In response, the British government announced the 
formation of a mandatory deradicalisation programme offering intensive 
help to persons who have already been radicalised to a serious extent.
33
 Here, 
too, it remains uncertain for now to what extent this programme will focus 
on would-be travellers and returnees. 
6.8  United States 
The US federal government has in a number of cases contacted the parents 
of would-be travellers to prevent their children from leaving the country.
34
 
FBI agents also pay visits to would-be travellers to make clear that the aut-
horities are watching them, to discourage them from travelling out and to 
warn that committing offences opens the door to criminal prosecution.
35
 It 
appears, however, that these practices are not carried out systematically.
36 
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The US all but lacks federal guidance for communities on how to intervene 
in the case of radicalised persons or persons at risk of becoming radi-
calised.
37
 Consequently, the US does not have federal intervention trajec-
tories along the lines of, for instance, the Channel programme in the UK. 
However, in cities such as Minneapolis-Saint Paul there have been attempts 
at an earlier stage to prevent radicalisation and people travelling out. From 
this city, which has the largest Somali American population of the US, about 
twenty young persons left for Somalia between 2007 and 2009 to join al-
Shabaab. As part of community policing, the FBI and local police undertook 
activities to create opportunities for the Somali community. These program-
mes were criticised, however, as mainly being a means of intelligence gat-
hering and/or attracting the required federal funding in times of spending 
cuts.
38
     
Since 2014, the federal government has paid renewed attention to developing 
local intervention strategies as a direct result of the 2013 Boston Marathon 
bombing. Initial steps were previously taken in 2011, but had limited finan-
cial backing and were incoherent in their implementation.
39
 The Three City 
Pilot is an example of a start towards developing local intervention strategies 
with potential federal application. The plans for Boston, Minneapolis-Saint 
Paul and Los Angeles were unveiled in January 2015.  
In spite of the pilot initiative, no specific intervention or supervision pro-
gramme have been set up insofar as is known.
40
 It can therefore be con-
cluded that the US does not have an official policy with regard to inter-
vention trajectories for would-be travellers and returnees. In 2015, the 
Homeland Security Committee counselled caution with regard to govern-
ment deradicalisation programmes, which it argued could threaten freedom 
of speech. In the committee’s view, a person’s immediate surroundings 
would be in a better position than civil servants to prevent radicalisation.
41
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In 2015 the FBI did decide in a number of cases to provide guidance for 
suspects rather than arresting them. Depending on the specific requirements, 
this guidance could involve teachers, religious experts, parents, friends 
and/or medical doctors. These interventions are seen as an important avenue 
for dealing with young people interested in IS, partly because of the barriers 
for the criminal prosecution of minors.
42
 However, the decision to provide 
guidance does not mean that the FBI will abandon criminal investigations 
against these persons.  
                                                                




7  Intelligence, investigation and detection 
7.1  Introduction 
An important part of investigating and monitoring travellers and returnees is 
gathering and exchanging intelligence. In contrast to the previous chapters, 
this does not really involve person-specific measures. Nonetheless, given the 
express cross-border nature of the phenomenon of people travelling to Syria 
and Iraq, it is relevant to devote some attention to the subject of international 
intelligence sharing. This chapter attempts to shed some light on a number of 
ways in which countries share intelligence on travellers and returnees. 
Unlike the other chapters, this chapter does not discuss each country separa-
tely in view of the limited availability of public information on international 
intelligence sharing. Besides detection and intelligence sharing through 
international systems, this chapter dwells briefly on these practices in a 
national context. 
7.2  Intelligence, detection and investigation in a national context 
In the US, fusion centers play a role in the response to actual or would-be 
travellers or returnees. As an example, in a recent case the federal govern-
ment was warned that an as yet unidentified American would have travelled 
out to join Islamist militants. This information was passed on to a fusion 
center, which collected supplementary information on the basis of local sour-
ces. This data enabled the fusion center to identify the traveller. This infor-
mation was shared with the federal government, who entered the person into 
the TSDB to prevent them returning to the US unnoticed.
1
 
In other countries, too, fusion centers play a role in the verification of tra-
vellers. In Belgium, for instance, any services that receive information about 
actual or would-be travellers are required to notify the OCAD immediately. 
This unit will request and collect supplementary information for verification 
purposes. The OCAD will also open an intelligence record that includes an 
                                                                





individual threat analysis on the basis of the collected data. The record will 
be made available to the LTF, which takes care of the local follow-up. 
Normally, the first type of local follow-up in Belgium is a police visit, as 
mentioned in chapter six. 
In contrast to European countries, all travellers in the US are screened 
through the use of various databases. Moments at which this happens include 
the purchase of a ticket, checking in and getting off a plane. These screen-
ings are aimed at recognising suspicious patterns and are a means of using 
up-to-date intelligence to recognise and stop would-be travellers. The EU 
prohibits EU citizens from being subjected to this type of systematic screen-
ing; however, it is applied to non-EU citizens. With regard to EU citizens, 




7.3  International detection, investigation and intelligence sharing 
Since 2004, the EU has provided for a European Arrest Warrant (EAW) 
against persons suspected or convicted of crimes. The Netherlands issues an 
EAW for each person known to have travelled out to Syria or Iraq.
3
 Count-
ries can also flag travel documents and persons through Interpol, Europol 
and the Schengen Information System (SIS). The SIS is a database that uses 
alerts to provide participating countries with information on individuals and 
objects registered as missing or wanted. An upgraded version, SIS II, was 
taken into use in 2013 and allows for uploading bio-metric data such as 
fingerprints, creating new alerts and connecting multiple alerts. The Nether-
lands has stated that it flags all rescinded passports in the SIS. In June 2015, 
Italy registered Anis Amri in SIS for having entered the Schengen Area 
illegally. In October 2016 the German federal police, the Federal Criminal 




The international police organisation Interpol runs the Stolen and Lost Tra-
vel Documents (SLTD) database. The Netherlands also uses this database to 
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flag passports it has rescinded and will be taking the SLTD into use for 
border checks.
5
 A large number of the 190 countries participating in Interpol 
do not do this.
6
 Interpol also maintains a ‘foreign terrorist fighter’ database, 
which can be consulted and added to by all 190 countries. However, in 
September 2015 this database was found to include a mere 5,000 names, 
while the total number of foreign fighters in Syria/Iraq is estimated at over 
25,000.
7
 In the case of the US, both the federal government and a select 
number of states have access to the database.
8
 Because of a reluctance to 
share intelligence, only a small number of the countries participating in 
Interpol are actually involved in keeping this database up-to-date.
9
 
In 2013 Europol, a partnership of police forces within the EU, set up Focal 
Point Travellers (FPT), a team of experts who register intelligence to be 
used for analysis. The FPT also supports member states in carrying out cri-
minal investigations into travellers. A second system for registering intelli-
gence on travellers is the Europol Information System (EIS), a personal 
records database that allows direct feedback to the member states. In 2015, 
the Netherlands and Belgium were among the few countries that were 
sharing intelligence with Europol in the context of the FPT and the EIS.
10
 
The number of countries willing to share intelligence has since risen and 
includes non-European countries. In 2016 Europol and the FBI signed an 
agreement involving the FBI in the FPT.
11
 
Eurojust is one context in which the European countries included in this 
study cooperate to investigate and prosecute criminals. he European coun-
tries included in this study cooperate This EU agency, located in The Hague, 
aims to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of national investigating 
and prosecuting authorities in their fight against serious international and 
organised crime.
12
 The number of cases in which the help of Eurojust was 
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sought has increased in the past years and includes counter-terrorism cases.
13
 
In 2015, most of the 41 counter-terrorism cases hailed from Belgium, France 
and Italy.
14
 The assistance provided included the exchange of intelligence 
(over a hundred instances in 2015) with regard to prosecutions for terrorist 
offences. 
Another, more intensive form of cooperation in the context of Eurojust 
consists of the so-called Joint Investigation Teams (JITs). This instrument is 
not often brought to bear against terrorism. A JIT is a team of judges, public 
prosecutors and other law enforcement authorities from various countries 
who carry out a judicial investigation in one or more countries for a specific 
period and with regard to a specific case.
15
 Such JITs are a highly effective 
form of international cooperation, but their success does depend on a history 
of cooperation and a high level of trust.
16
 Between neighbouring countries 
and in the field of jihadist terrorism of a highly transnational character, this 
Eurojust instrument offers a perspective for still more effective cooperation 
in investigating jihadists and bringing them to justice. 
As far as the intelligence and security services go, one form of intelligence 
sharing is the Counter Terrorism Group (CTG). This partnership was set up 
after the attacks on 11 September 2001 as part of the so-called Club de 
Berne, an informal meeting of the services to reinforce ties that go back to 
the seventies. The CTG comprises the services of the EU member states, 
Norway and Switzerland and meets every six months. It should be noted that 
this partnership does not form part of the EU. Since the November 2015 
Paris attacks, a number of steps have been taken within the CTG and on the 
initiative of the Netherlands to improve the exchange of intelligence. There 
has been a digital platform since 1 July 2016 allowing for faster and better 
intelligence exchange about Europeans who have joined jihadist organi-
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 Intelligence officers of the various services also meet in the 
Netherlands on a regular basis to be better able to interpret intelligence.
18
 
7.4  Bilateral intelligence sharing 
Lastly, intelligence can be exchanged bilaterally. Especially Turkey is a 
key partner in this regard. As an example, the Turkish authorities have a list 
drawn up by the Belgian government of known Belgian ‘extremists’. In 
August 2013, the use of this list led to three Belgians being denied entry into 
Turkey.
19
 Since 2012, Turkey has returned over 60 travellers to Belgium.
20
  
The UK also shares information on travellers with Turkey and does so with 
increasing frequency.
21
 In March 2015, three teenagers were stopped at a 
Turkish airport and returned to the UK, where they were arrested on 
suspicion of acting in preparation of terrorist offences (TA 2000, Section 5). 
Two of the teenagers had been reported missing to the British police, who 
immediately passed the information on to the Turkish authorities.
22
 
France is another example. Between September 2014 and October 2016, 
over 150 French nationals who sought to travel on to Syria or to return were 
arrested by the Turkish authorities and deported to France.
23
 This has not 
always gone smoothly: three French nationals deported by Turkey in 
September 2014 arrived in Marseille without being arrested by the security 
service. It was later found that the Turkish authorities had originally inten-
ded to include the men on a flight to Paris and had been late to notify France 
of the change of plan.
24
  
In November 2014 Bernard Cazeneuve, the then French Minister of the 
Interior, visited Turkey. The outcome of his visit was the ‘Cazeneuve’ proto-
col, intended to improve the sharing of intelligence by France with Turkey 
on French nationals travelling to Turkey. When Turkey detains a French 
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returnee already flagged by France, France provides consular assistance and 
an assessment of the person’s threat level, the person is briefly detained in 
Turkey and France opens a judicial investigation. If the returnee has not yet 
been registered by France, Turkey starts a judicial investigation and the 
person is then deported to France.
25 
  
                                                                




8  Military engagement and assistance with repatriation 
8.1  Introduction 
The Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, France and the UK are part of the US-
led Global Coalition against Daesh and have in the past period been active in 
or over Syria and/or Iraq. Military action includes reconnaissance flights, air 
strikes and providing training to Iraqi soldiers and Kurdish fighters. In addi-
tion, the several military intelligence services collect intelligence on the war-
ing parties. Only the UK and the US also take person-specific military act-
ions. Both countries have carried out targeted killings of their own nationals. 
At the same time, the coalition has been reported as wanting to formulate a 
plan to encourage Western travellers who joined IS to turn themselves in so 
as to help them return to their home countries.
1
 So far this has remained an 
unconfirmed idea. In the past months, however, an increasing number of 
Western travellers have contacted their governments asking for consular 
assistance. Reportedly, 150 persons did this in the summer of 2016 alone.
2
 
To be able to get assistance, the traveller in many cases needs to report to a 
consulate in Turkey or Iraq. They are first questioned by the Turkish or Iraqi 
authorities for a number of weeks before being handed over to represen-
tatives of foreign embassies.
3  
8.2  The Netherlands 
Between October 2014 and July 2016, the Netherlands made F-16s available 
for air strikes against IS targets.
4
 These strikes were initially limited to Iraq; 
from February 2016 on they also took place in Eastern Syria. The primary 
aim of these actions was to disrupt supply lines, to destroy strategic locations 
and to provide air support to ground forces fighting IS.
5
 Targeted drone 
killings do not form part of the Dutch military contribution; the Minister of 
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Defence has repeatedly emphasised that ‘the Netherlands does not take part 
in liquidations carried out with drones’.
6
 In the framework of the Global 
Coalition against Daesh, the Dutch air force was relieved by Belgium 
midway through 2016. The Dutch military is currently still active providing 
security for the Belgian detachment and training Iraqi soldiers and Kurdish 
Peshmerga fighters, a training mission that began in February 2015. 
With regard to the repatriation of travellers, the Ministry of Security and 
Justice and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have declared that everyone is 
entitled to consular assistance from Dutch embassies in neighbouring coun-
tries, but that people need to report to the embassies in order to qualify.
7
 For 
this reason, the two ministries indicated they could not do much to take the 
Dutch IS-fighter Reda N. out of a rehabilitation camp run by rebels in Syria.
8
 
Nonetheless, contacts between Reda N.’s father and the Ministry of Foreign 




Consular assistance is not the only form of aid consulates or embassies can 
offer. For instance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that the consu-
late in Erbil (Iraq) was ready to assist Laura H. – who claimed to have fled 
from IS and was being held by Kurds – through such measures as providing 
travel documents, mediating or asking family members to transfer money for 
a flight ticket.
10
 It is not clear whether the consulate did provide any 
assistance. Dutch embassies can also provide assistance in case of contact 
(either initial or renewed) with family members.
11
 Laura H. flew back to the 
Netherlands at the start of August 2016 and was arrested there. Reda N., who 
allegedly fled the rehabilitation camp, was arrested in Turkey when trying to 
cross the border from Syria. A Dutch embassy employee visited him in pri-
son in Ankara.
12  
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8.3  Belgium 
The Belgian air force flew missions over Iraq between October 2014 and 
June 2015, when the operation ended for budgetary reasons. The Belgian 
Ministry of Defence is reluctant to provide information about military 
engagement.
13
 The operation was resumed in 2016, with Belgian F-16s 
active over Iraq again as well as over Syria.  
In 2013, the Minister of the Interior made ten proposals for dealing with 
travellers. One proposal was to draw up a list of contact persons in Syria 
who might be able to help with the repatriation of such people.
14
 One person 
who travelled out and whom Belgium refused to repatriate is Harris C., who 
was alleged to have fought in Somalia and Syria, respectively. He was 
wounded in a bombardment in Syria and ended up in a Turkish hospital. In 
June, the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated it was unwilling to 
return the man to Belgium. Because of this, his father tried to take him to a 
Belgian hospital by car.  
A European arrest warrant had been issued against Harris C., and he was 
detained in 2014 when trying to cross the border from Turkey into Bulgaria 
with his father.
15
 At the end of 2015, C. was sentenced to four years in 
prison. Another Belgian father who had gone to Turkey to try to repatriate 
his son in Syria had ‘regular indirect contact with the Belgian embassy in the 
Turkish city of Ankara’.
16
 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed it 
knew about the father’s activities. These examples appear to indicate that the 
Belgian government does not provide active support to travellers or to their 
family members.  
8.4  Denmark 
Denmark joined the Global Coalition against Daesh in September 2014. 
After a year of Danish F-16s flying nearly 500 sorties over Iraq and Syria, 
the planes returned to Denmark. About 120 soldiers stayed in Iraq to train 
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 In April 2016, the Danish parliament voted to resume its air 
operations for a period of six months as well as to deploy 400 ground troops. 
These include 60 Special Forces charged with ‘a range of missions’ in Iraq 
and Syria.
18
 Denmark took its decision to intensify military involvement 
following requests from France and the US. 
The available public sources suggest that Denmark is not taking a person-
specific approach in the region. Although attempts were made at the local 
level – in the city of Aarhus – to help returnees reintegrate into society, there 
is no active policy at the national level or on the part of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs to help Danish subjects return to Denmark from Syria or 
Iraq.  
8.5  Germany 
At the start of December 2015, the German parliament voted in favour of 
military assistance in the fight against IS. The decision was taken following 
a request from France in the wake of the attacks in Paris of the previous 
month. Germany itself does not carry out air strikes, opting instead for a sup-
porting role: the air force only conducts reconnaissance flights, and a frigate 
of the German Navy provides support to the French aircraft carrier Charles 
de Gaulle.
19
 In addition, Germany provides military training to the Pesh-
merga in the Kurdish part of Iraq. 
Although the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides a lot of infor-
mation on its website about the risks of travelling to Syria and calls on 
German citizens to leave Syria, Germany has no active policy for supporting 
or supervising the return of travellers.
20
 
A report in Der Spiegel showed that the German intelligence and security 
services did use an informer who was an IS member. Chapter three on 
Criminal law mentions that Ali R. is being prosecuted for membership in a 
terrorist organisation. In December 2014, R. allegedly followed his wife to 
Syria against his will. According to Der Spiegel, R. would have got in touch 
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with the Berlin security service at a previous stage. His stay in Syria would 
have provided valuable information to the intelligence and security services 
about the functioning of IS. In October 2015, R. and his children travelled to 
Kurdish territory ruled by the YPG. The German intelligence service was 
said to have assisted with his repatriation.
21
 
8.6  France 
In September 2014, France began a military operation by carrying out air 
strikes. At the start of 2015 – after the attack on the office of the satirical 
magazine Charlie Hebdo – the French President Hollande announced the 
engagement of the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle in the fight against IS. 
In September 2015, France carried out its first air strikes in Syrian territory. 
Following the November 2015 Paris attacks, Hollande declared that French 
fighters jets would be stepping up their bombardments. In addition, France 
sent Special Forces to Syria in 2016. The government stated that these troops 
would be deployed to provide military training and advice and would not 
engage in direct fighting against IS.
22
 
When bombarding IS positions, the French government is aware of the 
possible presence of French nationals. Prime Minister Manuel Valls confir-
med that French travellers had been killed in an attack on an IS camp in 
Raqqa in October 2015.
23
 Valls parried criticism by saying that he did not 
see this as a problem: the goal, according to Valls, was to hit IS and in his 
view terrorists did not have passports.
24
  
In view of the number of French travellers and the frequency of French air 
sorties over Syria and Iraq, it could be argued that such situations occur 
more frequently and that the French government appears not to see a pro-
blem if its nationals get killed. No proof has been found of targeted killings 
by French soldiers.
25
 However, a number of persons involved in the Paris 
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attacks were killed by the US in targeted attacks in Syria. The degree of 
cooperation between Paris and Washington is unclear. 
The French government does not seem to have an active policy for assisting 
French travellers who have stated publicly that they want to return to France. 
In the case of a few persons detained by the Free Syrian Army, the Turkish 
government has been found willing to escort them to a Turkish border cross-
ing and to detain them until they leave for France. The French Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs has indicated it does not play a role at least in this case.
26
 
Reports that France is getting French nationals who have deserted out of 
Syria and Iraq are not confirmed officially by the French government.
27  
8.7  United Kingdom 
On 26 September 2014, the British parliament approved the engagement of 
the Royal Air Force in Iraqi airspace. The first air strikes were carried out 
four days later.
28
 On 2 December 2015, the British parliament passed a mo-
tion to extend the operation to include Syria.
29
 Shortly afterwards, the first 
British Tornado jets took off to bombard IS targets in Syria.  
The UK has stated: ‘We will act decisively where terrorists pose an immin-
ent threat to the UK and our interests overseas or to our allies.’
30
 In conse-
quence, and other than the countries discussed above, the UK carries out 
targeted killings of its own subjects. August 2015 was the first time a Briton 
was killed deliberately in a precision attack in which another Briton and a 
Belgian traveller were also killed.
31
 In November 2015, Mohammed Em-
wazi, also known as Jihadi John, was killed in an American drone attack in 
Syria.  
The British Prime Minister David Cameron stated that the UK and the US 
had cooperated intensively to determine Emwazi’s location and to neutralise 
him.
32
 Furthermore, British Special Forces are posted in Iraq and allegedly 
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have a kill or capture list with 200 names of British travellers who joined IS. 
Captured British travellers were reportedly being handed over to the Iraqi 
authorities.
33
 The British Ministry of Defence, which generally does not 
comment on the use of Special Forces, declined to confirm these actions. 
There does not seem to be a person-specific approach in Syria to help British 
IS-fighters who are disillusioned or who were captured by the Syrian oppo-
sition to return to Britain.  
8.8  United States 
In August 2014, the US began air strikes against IS targets in Iraq.
34
 Shortly 
afterwards, on 5 September, the US declared it had formed a core coalition 
against IS. This US-led Global Coalition against Daesh and the operation 
Inherent Resolve would eventually include over sixty countries. 
US military involvement includes the use of fighter jets, Special Forces and 
Predator and Reaper drones. The previously cited case of Emwazi shows that 
the US is using these drones to carry out targeted killings. Since 2010 the 
American government has used a Disposition Matrix, also known as the kill 
list, that includes possible enemies of the US.
35
  
The first American to be added to the list, Anwar al-Awlaki, was added in 
2010 and was killed in a drone attack in Yemen in September 2011. As far 
as is known, al-Awlaki is as yet the only American deliberately killed by the 
American government. Other Americans killed by American drones, such as 
Kemal Darwish (Yemen, 2002), Samir Khan (Yemen, 2011) and Jude Kenan 
Mohammed (Pakistan, 2013) were, according to a spokesperson, ‘in the 
wrong place at the wrong time’ rather than being specific targets.
36
 
American drones have also killed Europeans. In some cases, such as that of 
Emwazi, these were targeted killings. In other cases this is unclear, such as 
in the case of a Belgian killed in Syria in December 2016 and the previously 
cited attacks against those involved in the Paris attacks. The Pentagon is 
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reluctant to provide information on the use of US Special Forces, but has 
repeatedly declared that their role is limited to ‘providing advice and 
assistance’.
37
 However, it seems these troops also have a mandate to go on 
the offensive, as was shown by an operation north of the Syrian city of Deir 
ez-Zor at the start of January 2017.
38
  
With regard to the repatriation of travellers, the intentions and policy of the 
US are unclear. The case of Eric H. in 2014 showed that the US government 
may not just have been interested in his return but also in obtaining 
information about the situation in Syria. After various interviews conducted 
by the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), H. was offered a 
flight ticket from Turkey to the US. An American agent accompanied him on 
his flight back. Against his expectations, the FBI arrested H. on arrival.
39
 
Cooperation between the US and Turkey to prevent people travelling out or 
to send them back has since been intensified. The CIA and its Turkish 
counterpart, the MIT, reportedly have a secret joint coordination centre near 
the Turkish border.
40
 It is not clear whether person-specific measures are 
being taken with regard to returnees in the context of these collaborations. 
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9  Conclusion 
9.1  Introduction 
This report provides an overview of policy and legislation in the Nether-
lands, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, the UK and the US with regard 
to dealing with actual and would-be travellers to and returnees from Syria or 
Iraq, with a focus on initiatives taken between 2010 and the end of 2016 and 
on person-specific measures. We have worked with publicly available infor-
mation and attempted to contextualise the measures with reference to the 
moment of implementation. To do so, we have distinguished five phases: (1) 
the person concerned is still in his or her country of residence but is or may 
be ready to travel out; (2) the person concerned is on the way to a foreign 
destination with the possible intention of participating in jihad; (3) the 
person is staying in a foreign area of conflict; (4) the person leaves the area 
of conflict and travels back to his or her country of residence; (5) the person 
has returned to his or her country of residence. 
The general picture that emerges from this inventory is that the response to 
actual and would-be travellers and returnees represents a quest on the part of 
governments to get to grips with these problems. To do so they rely on a 
broad range of measures. Although the countries differ considerably in their 
political organisation, competences and legal cultures, we have found that by 
and large they take the same approach, with the difference being in the 
detail. Most initiatives centre on phases one and five. This is no surprise, as 
these are the phases in which the actual or would-be traveller or the returnee 
is in the state’s territory, where the government has the greatest authority to 
act. Even so, in these phases most attention is focused on limiting the 
person’s mobility, whether through (preferably early) intervention in the area 
of criminal law or through passport-related measures. The greatest differen-
ces were found in social interventions – in particular the reintegration trajec-
tories – and in military engagement, with the UK and the US being the most 




9.2  Criminal law 
The core of the response by all countries consists of the judiciary framework 
and criminal law in particular. This is not entirely surprising, as the concerns 
about actual and would-be travellers and returnees mostly revolve around the 
actual or potential use of violence. All countries use criminal law acts that 
touch on terrorist offences. Many countries have expanded this area of legis-
lation since 2014 in order to make travelling to areas of conflict a punishable 
offence. These offences mainly involve training for terrorist purposes and 
travelling abroad to join terrorist organisations. 
The question is whether further developments in criminal law will help pro-
vide a better grip on the problem posed by travellers. Germany, France and 
the US have mainly used existing counter-terrorism legislation, which in the 
case of the first two countries dates back to well before 11 September 2001. 
Then there are examples from France and Denmark demonstrating that it is 
not always easy to gather sufficient evidence in a case. The report also cites 
cases from the Netherlands, Germany and the US where prosecuting authori-
ties have resorted to non-terrorism-related legislation to try to secure a con-
viction. It would be interesting to examine to what extent the use of non-
terrorism-related legislation leads to actual convictions. 
9.3  Restrictive measures 
There are also the measures that are not grounded in criminal law while still 
having a restrictive or punitive effect, such as electronic tagging, house 
arrest, freezing financial assets, cutting off social security, deporting non-
nationals and/or seizing or voiding passports and identity documents. These 
measures also include taking away a person’s dual nationality. 
Measures in connection with electronic tagging differ per country. France 
allows this if a person has attempted to travel out or is suspected of wanting 
to do so, as well as after a person has served a prison sentence. In Germany 
only the latter option applies, although some have argued in favour of pre-
ventive electronic tagging. In Belgium, too, there has been a call for pre-
ventive tagging, but the use of electronic tags is focused on a specific type of 




secution is not feasible. People have managed to travel to Syria from Ger-
many and France in spite of having had their passport revoked. In France, a 
person managed to commit an attack despite wearing an electronic tag. This 
gives rise to the question of what may be expected of these restrictive 
measures in terms of prevention or of countering people who travel out or 
commit terrorist offences. Are these measures mainly symbolic in nature, or 
do they actually reduce the risk of persons travelling out or committing 
attacks? 
9.4  Social interventions 
Generally speaking, the initiatives and projects in the field of social inter-
ventions are very similar between countries. In the case of Belgium, Ger-
many, France and the US it was found that the police or the security service 
try to contact the person suspected of seeking to travel out and/or his or her 
direct surroundings to try to prevent them from travelling out. All of the 
reviewed countries are also introducing similarly structured reintegration 
trajectories, with an emphasis on a person-specific, local approach as well as 
on the multidisciplinary use of resources. Some countries, such as the 
Netherlands and the UK, have greater coordination at the national level, 
while other countries, such as Germany and the US, provide for a greater 
role for the states and/or individual cities. There are also different levels of 
involvement of non-state actors, with the social sector playing a role 
especially in Germany, but also in the Netherlands. There are marked 
differences, however, in the implementation of reintegration policy. The 
Netherlands, Denmark, Germany and the UK have been active in this area 
for some time, whereas the US and especially France are relative newcomers 
to it. Note that this implies nothing about the degree of effectiveness of such 
initiatives. 
9.5  Military engagement and repatriation 
The seven reviewed countries all carry out military action against IS in Syria 
and/or Iraq or provide indirect support to such action. Western travellers to 
Syria or Iraq get killed in these actions, but only the UK and the US indicate 




involved in person-specific military actions in Iraq and Syria. There is a 
great deal of ambiguity about how the other countries deal with knowledge 
about the presence of their own nationals who have travelled out and 
possible military action in which these nationals get killed. The same goes 
for assistance with repatriation, for which most countries do not officially 
have any active policy. In practice, however, the situation has been found to 
be different in some cases. There is a reluctance to comment on, and a lack 
of transparency around, both military action against and assistance provided 
to travellers. This is the case to a degree that one could speak of a taboo with 
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